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I. INTRODUCrION
There is a certain mysticism in the process of analyzing a transaction for its true
nature. A lawyer may, at first blush, identify a transaction as a "property" or
"contract" problem. Upon deeper thought, she may discover that these categories are
at best vague estimates of the legal rights associated with the transaction, with
elements arbitrarily identified with one or another category. Indeed, it is the very
nature of law that these distinctions are not easily articulated. Perhaps that is why
lawyers return repeatedly to that truism of legal analysis, "I can't define it, '[b]ut I
know it when I see it.""
By saying that "we know it when we see it," lawyers are doing more than
obscuring an otherwise objective process. An understanding which is in part educated
and in part intuitive permits a differentiation among related ideas, even when the
lawyer is not capable of articulating a simple rule. Even without the benefit of a
neatly expressed rule, the distinctions resulting from this process may provide a
meaningful standard, but only if the standard can be applied consistently to similar
transactions.
For example, suppose two participants in a game take twenty cards of an identical
blue color. They agree that ten of the cards will be considered "blue" and ten of the
cards will be considered "red." In order to provide consistency, they identify the red
cards with a tiny letter "R" in a comer. Then they play the game, the results of which
are determined by the order of blue and red cards dealt. A casual observer of this game
might suffer confusion, protesting that all of the cards are in fact blue, and that there
is no difference between the color of the blue cards and the red cards, but to the players
this objection is irrelevant. The distinction has been made, and applied consistently
with predictable results, so that the goals of the participants are served. The standard
chosen in this case does not rely upon the inherent qualities of the cards, but only upon
the arbitrary distinction applied by the players.
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1. Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 197 (1964) (Stewart, J., concurring). It is the elusive nature of legal analysis
that makes teaching law such a rewarding experience for the teacher, and such a frustrating process for students. It is only
by dealing repeatedly with concepts, using hypotheticals to pinpoint distinctions, deconstmcting these distinctions, and
returning to basic concepts, that students are able to understand that legal analysis is ultimately not a doctrinal but a
philosophical process.
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Now imagine the same game, played with ten red cards and ten blue cards. In
this case, the inherent difference between the color of the cards is apparent not only
to the players, but to the observer. Given this readily identifiable distinction, there is
no doubt about the predictablility of results, nor the consistency of the rule applied.
Imagine, now, a third possibility, with cards ranging from red to blue,
throughout the spectrum. In this example, the extremes are apparent: there is an
inherent and readily distinguishable difference between the red and blue cards. But
what of the purple hues? How should the rules be applied to differentiate consistently
between those which are closer to red, and therefore will be treated as red, and those
which are categorized as blue? The players could apply the arbitrary standard, as used
in the first game, or they could compare each purple card to a red and a blue, and
determine on an ad hoc basis which color it most resembles. This test will lead to
results which are far less predictable and consistent. But if the players develop a
uniform standard that reflects both the inherent distinctions between red and blue, and
that accounts consistently for the close cases, then predictability will be achieved.
This analogy to the process of legal analysis is peculiarly applicable in the study
of personal property rights and the transactions associated with their transfer. There
is something elusive about the elements which definitively identify a transaction as a
"sale," a "lease," or a "security interest." We may discern some very specific
characteristics about each of these concepts at the extremes, and yet lack the ability
to identify the critical factors which distinguish them as they begin to approach one
another. Only by focusing upon these essential aspects can we begin to understand the
true nature of the transaction. 2
We must grasp at the outset that sales, leases, and security interests are distinct
transactions and are not different terms for the same rights. Each transaction has its
own true nature. When we pinpoint the critical distinctions between these transac-
tions, we will no longer be confused by the particular contract provisions used in
accomplishing the transaction. The terms of the contract governing the transaction
may change, and yet our understanding of its true nature should remain constant. And
when this true nature has been pinpointed, we can apply the understanding to
different transactions with consistent results. In those cases in which the true nature
is not readily distinguishable, as with the purple cards, predictability should be the
ultimate goal. However, the inherent distinctions should be pinpointed and utilized
before applying a test which relies solely upon consistency.
In one sense, this categorization process is also a matter of legal realism. There
is a longstanding controversy that exists in the literature of commercial law
concerning the meaningful distinctions that may be made between a sale and a lease. 3
2. I have used the phrase true nature to refer to those essential qualities of each transaction which would
distinguish it, both from an economic and legal perspective, from each other transaction. It also distinguishes the true
nature from those other qualities that have attracted the attention of courts addressing this problem. The phrase will be
used throughout this Article to distinguish between the factors that are critical to the economic allocation effected by the
transaction, and those that are not relevant to the economic analysis, and may tend to mislead participants in their
discussion of these transactions.
3. See, e.g., Ayer, Further Thoughts on Lease and Sale, 1983 Arz. ST. L.J. 341 thereinafter Ayer, Further
Thoughts]; Ayer, On the Vacuity of the SalelLease Distinction, 68 IowA L. Rav. 667 (1983) [hereinafter Ayer, On the
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As a matter of legal scholarship, the analytical basis for distinguishing may be
minimal, to some even nonexistent. 4 This Article does not take sides in this
controversy, and, indeed builds upon the work of the participants. But the most
compelling premise behind this Article is that the parties to these transactions
understand them to be distinct, and these parties have both a legal and practical basis
for so assuming.
The law has long differentiated between a sale and a lease, although it has never
provided a consistent framework for the distinction in the area of personal property.
5
Further, the tax laws treat these transactions differently, 6 the rules of accounting
recognize a distinction, 7 the Uniform Commercial Code (U.C.C. or Code) recognizes
Vacuity]; Boss, Panacea or Nightmare? Leases in Article 2, 64 B.U.L. REV. 39 (1984); Boss, Leases & Sales: Ne'er or
Where Shall The Twain Meet? 1983 ARja. ST. L.J. 357; Coogan, Is There a Difference Between A Long-Term Lease and
an Installment Sale?, 56 N.Y.U. L. Ra,. 1036, revised and reprinted in 1 BENDE's UrNvo.m Co.m aAL CODE SuERvcs,
SEcURED TRANsAcnoNS Ch. 4.2 (1983) [hereinafter Coogan, Is There a Difference?]; Coogan, Leases of Equipment and
Some Other Unconventional Security Devices: An Analysis of UCC Section 1-201(37) and Article 9, 1973 DuE L.J. 909,
reprinted in 1 BemER's UsasostM Co.mmass. CODE SExvicE, Svcursn TRANsAcnoss Ch. 4A (1981) [hereinafter Coogan, Some
Unconventional Security Devices]; Coogan & Boss, Uniform Commercial Code Treatment for All Leases, I BErr:'s
Co.AE cuj. CODE StavcE, SEcuan TRAsAcnoNs Ch. 4.3 (1983) [hereinafter Coogan & Boss, U.C.C. Treatment for All
Leases]; Mooney, Personal Property Leasing: A Challenge, 36 Bus. LAw. 1605 (1981); Kripke, Book Review, 37 Bus.
LAw. 723 (1982). The fervor of the participants in this discussion is such that it is tempting to refer to it as the "liturgy"
of personal property. Working from the very valuable premises identified in these articles, I have chosen an approach
suggested by legal realism. I believe that what truly matters is an understanding of the true nature of the transactions, with
the ultimate goal of creating a consistent set of guidelines upon which participants in these transactions can rely in
negotiation and planning. As the discussion of economic analysis infra at text accompanying notes 42-52 suggests, I am
convinced that meaningful distinctions may be made, and my commendation of the approach taken by proposed U.C.C.
Article 2A, As.nmcAN LAw INsrrmrn AND NAToAL Co.vmascE OF CoussuoNmes ON UmFORm STATE LAws, Article 2A, Leases
(with Conforming Amendments to Articles I and 9) (1987 Official Text with Comments) [hereinafter Article 2A ], and the
proposed amendment to U.C.C. § 1-201(37), A.,sucASN LAw "Iassmum AND NATIONAL CoNFERENcE OF Co .soaNs ON
USNioRm STATE LAws, Article 2A, Leases (with Conforming Amendments to Articles I and 9) (1987 Official Text with
Comments) [hereinafterProposedAmendment, U.C.C. § 1-201(37)] is that these distinctions are based upon the economic
effect of a transaction-presumably the same issue upon which the parties themselves have focused. See Proposed
Amendment, U.C.C. § 1-201(37), Official Comment (All of the tests under the Proposed Amendment focus upon
economics, not upon the intent of the parties.).
4. See Ayer, Further Thoughts, supra note 3; Ayer, On the Vacuity, supra note 3.
5. For an excellent historical overview, see Coogan, Some Unconventional Security Devices, supra note 3, at
§§ 4A.01[5][a] and 4A.02.
6. See I.R.C. § 168(0(8) as amended by the Tax Reform Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-514, § 201, 100 Stat.
2085. On the tax implications of leasing transactions, see RmsEAc lsTamn OF ASmEucA, The Complete Analysis of the '86
Tax Reform Act 541-42 (RIA, Inc., 1986) (a general overview of the changes in the 1986 Act); Auster, Should the
Lessor or the Lessee Claim the Investment Credit After 1983?, 14 TAx ADvISOR 552 (1983) (discussing the effect of the
Tax Equity and Fiscal Responsibility Act of 1982 on leasing transactions) ; Levine & Cohn, Equipment Leasing after the
Deficit Reduction Act of 1984: An Overview, 15 TAx ADvISOR 531 (1984) (discussing the changes effected by the 1984
Act); Note, From I.T.C. to U.C.C.: Using Federal Tax Criteria to Ensure Lease Treatment Under the Uniform
Commercial Code, 1986 CIu~m. Bus. L.J. 233 (while I disagree with the author's conclusions, the article contains a useful
discussion of the effect of the Tax Reform Act of 1986 on leasing transactions).
The tax aspects of leasing transactions have probably contributed more than any other factor to the confusion between
leases and secured transactions. Parties who might otherwise have created a security interest have been induced to call
their transactions "leases" in order to gain available advantages. But these transactions were leases for tax purposes, and
in some sense the economic decisions of the parties to "lease" instead of "buy" made them leases as a matter of legal
realism, if not as a matter of commercial law. There has been some reason to expect that these hybrid transactions would
disappear with the new tax laws, but the new laws contain provisions which favor leasing as a transaction form. See the
Tax Reform Act of 1986, supra, at §201. As other economic advantages appear, new hybrids will arise, and they will
still be leases to the participants, whether or not commercial law scholars and courts continue to hold their stubborn
opinions that they cannot be.
7. For an analysis on the impact of accounting principles on this problem, see Coogan, Some Unconventional
Security Devices, supra note 3, at § 4A.06[1 1] and 4A.06.1-.06.3.
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(at least in its terms if not its application) that there is a difference, 8 and perhaps most
importantly, the Bankruptcy Code distinguishes between them. 9 Like the example of
the card game, if we rely first upon inherent distinctions, and aim for a goal of
consistent results in the close cases, the participants, who have based their decisions
upon the fact that a difference exists, will be satisfied with the rules of law that apply
to their transactions.1 0 It seems, therefore, that the job of lawyers is not to continue
questioning whether any distinction exists, but rather to provide a framework for
consistent distinctions between sales, leases, and security interests.
For example, suppose a person wishes to obtain the use of an automobile for
business purposes. She goes to a car dealer, who explains that she may buy a car for
cash, she may finance the purchase, or she may lease the car. Depending upon the
terms of the transaction, the economic result will be different. Upon consultation with
her accountant and attorney, she will decide in what form she wishes to acquire the
use of the car. Her economic position will be different depending upon which
transaction she chooses. To her, these are distinct transactions.I'
What is it about these transactions which makes them distinct to the parties? It
is not the label placed on them, nor the policies underlying the applicable laws that
primarily concern the parties. Rather, it is the economic allocation effected by the
transaction which is of primary concern. Both transferor and transferee are asking the
same question: "Given the resources I have to accomplish this transfer, how can I
obtain the greatest economic value?" Obviously, the relevant tax and bankruptcy
laws will concern both transferor and transferee, but only because those laws may
alter the economic allocation between the parties. Whether the name given to the
8. See U.C.C. § 1-201(37) (1978) (unless otherwise indicated, all citations to the Code are to the 1978 Official
Text, contained in SarcrED Comrasmci. STATur1s (West 1987)).
9. If a bankruptcy court determines that a transaction is an unexpired lease, it may be assumed or rejected by the
trustee (I1 U.S.C. § 365 (1982)), but in either case, the lessor retains rights to the goods. See In re Air Vt., Inc., 44
Bankr. 440 (Bankr. D. Vt. 1984); In re Atlanta Times, Inc., 3 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 893 (N.D. Ga. 1966)
(decided by referee), rev. denied 259 F. Supp. 820 (N.D. Ga. 1966), aff'd sub nom. Sanders v. National Acceptance Co.
of Am., 383 F.2d 606 (5th Cir. 1967). If, however, the court determines that a transaction is a sale, the seller may exercise
rights in the specific goods only to the extent of his perfected security interest. 11 U.S.C. § 506(a) (1982). If the lessor
has failed to make a protective filing under U.C.C. § 9-408, the interest will be unperfected, and the lessor will be an
unsecured creditor in the bankruptcy, with no specific rights in the leased goods. See I1 U.S.C. § 544(a)(1) (1982); In
re Pacific Express, Inc., 780 F.2d 1482 (9th Cir. 1986); In re Virginia Air Conditioning Co., 11 U.C.C. Rep. Serv.
(Callaghan) 1260 (W.D. Va. 1972) (decided by referee). See generally infra text accompanying notes 142-46.
10. This is not to suggest that the participants in these transactions are satisfied with the distinctions currently
provided by the law. Rather, the participants raise justified complaints both that the existing legal distinctions are
incomprehensible, and that these distinctions are inconsistent. It is impossible under the current version of the U.C.C. to
determine what factors will cause a court to find that a particular transfer is a security interest, and not a lease. See infra
text accompanying notes 78-148. Further, these factors are not the same as those applied in determining whether the
transfer is a sale for tax purposes, see supra note 6, or whether it is an executory contract under the Bankruptcy Code.
See supra note 9. See generally Fogel, Executory Contracts and Unexpired Leases in the Bankruptcy Code, 64 MInm. L.
Rav. 341 (1980). But assuming that it is possible to provide a reasonable legal basis for these determinations, and a
measure of consistency among the relevant laws, I do not think that people involved in these transactions think that all
distinctions among them should be abolished in favor of a uniform treatment for all forms of shared interests in personal
property.
11. Again, this Article does not address the merits of a policy to favor one transaction over another in the taxlaws.
Rather, no matter how we define the benefits associated with the transaction as a matter of tax policy, economic benefits
can be obtained by varying allocation of property rights among the participants to these transactions. For example, the
participant experiences a different economic impact if she buys the car and sells it after a week than if she leases the car
for a week.
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transaction is lease, sale, or security interest, the inquiry is the same. As a result, any
inquiry about the true nature of these transactions must necessarily center on the
manner in which the economic value represented by the goods is being allocated
among the parties. All other indicia which may make a transaction look more like a
sale, or more like a lease, are of only peripheral importance.
This Article argues that the courts must focus on the economic transfer effected
by the transaction in order to ascertain the true nature of a personal property transfer.
Part II of this Article addresses the problems that currently exist in the law governing
personal property transactions. First, Part II provides a brief introduction to Article
2A, the new article of the U.C.C. which governs personal property leasing transac-
tions. In particular, the Article focuses upon the proposed amendment to Section
1-210(37) of the U.C.C., which defines "security interest." This proposed amend-
ment provides a uniform set of guidelines to assist courts in determining whether a
particular transaction is a sale, a lease, or a security interest. Second, Part II explores
in-depth the difficulty in distinguishing among these transactions, beginning with a
simple model and building to a discussion of three troublesome lease provisions: the
option to buy, the lease to the end of useful life, and the option to renew.
Part II analyzes the current state of the law in detail, focusing upon the extreme
difficulty courts have had creating consistent standards for the distinctions among
sales, leases, and security interests. It explains why the often subtle difference
between a lease and a security interest is crucial in practice. Part III goes on to focus
upon the proposed amendment to the definition of "security interest," which
provides a uniform framework for distinguishing between leases and security interests
by focusing upon economic reality, or the "true nature" of the transaction. In
analyzing the proposed definition, Part I reexamines each of the complex lease
provisions discussed above: the option to buy, the lease to the end of economic life,
and the option to renew, supplying the Article 2A answer to the lease-security
interest dichotomy in each case.
Finally, the Article focuses upon some interpretive problems still remaining
under the proposed definition. The Article concludes that, while Article 2A has not
entirely resolved the controversy for every case, it does provide courts with
guidelines for deciding most lease-security interest issues, and it also provides a
framework to guide the courts when there is no clearcut answer based upon the true
nature of the transaction.
II. THE AGENDA FOR REFORM: IssuEs TO BE RESOLVED BY ARTICLE 2A AND THE
PROPOSED DEFINrION OF "SEcuRrrY INTEREST"
This Article begins its analysis by assuming that if there is a problem in
understanding what is a sale, a lease, or a security interest, it is not because these are
all really the same transaction, but because the basis in the law for distinguishing
among them has become hopelessly blurred. The problem arises because the cases
have failed to identify the factors that are critical in distinguishing these transactions
in economic terms, and have focused instead on peripheral issues. Although the
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blame for this confusion may be placed on the concepts themselves, it seems that the
responsibility is more logically placed on the minimal guidance provided by the
current version of the U.C.C.12
The U.C.C. simply does not explain what constitutes a sale, a lease, or a
security interest. It is impossible to discern, by even the most careful reading of the
Code, what the critical distinctions are between a sale and a lease. The guidance
offered for distinguishing between a lease and a secured transaction raises more
questions than it answers. 13
Consequently, the parties who enter into these transactions must either choose
safe positions at the extreme, or risk the possibility that a court will resolve disputes
concerning the transaction by applying standards which cannot be ascertained in
advance. Obviously, this uncertainty has an economic impact on the parties if it
prevents them from entering into preferred transactions, or if it raises the transaction
costs of the preferred transactions. The current version of the U.C.C. offers guidance
to the parties only when they play their red and blue cards; when they play their
purple cards, they risk a court interepretation of the transaction that ignores the
parties' understanding or intent.
The issue of intent in this context is a complex one. Obviously, the expressed
intent of the parties cannot be the only distinguishing factor.14 The cases hold, quite
correctly, that the interpretation of the transaction cannot be based only upon the
expressed intent of the parties, since they may call their transaction one thing in an
attempt to avoid the consequences of calling it what it really is. 15 There is a
12. A related problem is that these transactions are subject to a variety of inconsistent statutes. The tax laws offer
one standard, the bankruptcy laws another, and the current version of the U.C.C. offers yet a third. See supra notes 6-9.
Although all of these statutes implement very different policies, the policy underlying the applicable law is only relevant
to the parties to these transactions insofar as it alters the economic allocation that they wish to accomplish. No one, for
example, enters into a lease in order to further a policy underlying the tax laws. Rather, they wish to take advantage of
relevant tax laws to effectuate a superior economic exchange, and to avoid the negative impact of an exchange which runs
afoul of these laws. Surely no lessor and lessee have ever included in their negotiation over lease terms a discussion of
a tax policy which may encourage or discourage one form of lease. They simply identify the necessary indicia to obtain
the tax allocation they desire and incorporate them into the transaction. The difficulty arises when the tax laws require
them to do something which runs afoul of the U.C.C., or which alters the agreed allocation if a bankruptcy petition is
filed. See supra notes 6 and 9.
13. U.C.C. § 1-201(37).
14. U.C.C. § 1-201(37) uses the word "intent" when it draws the distinction between a lease and security interest,
stating: "Whether a lease is intended as security is to be determined by the facts of each case .... Section 9-102(1)(a)
explains that Article 9 applies "to any transaction (regardless of its form) which is intended to create a security
interest .... " Official Comment 1 to that section elaborates: "When it is found that a security interest as defined in
§ 1-201(37) was intended, this Article applies regardless of the form of the transaction or the name by which the parties
may have christened it." It is clear from this language that neither the subjective intent of the parties, nor their objective
manifestation through the language used to describe the transaction, is controlling.
No one would contend that third parties were bound by the clear intention of the contracting parties to use a
device they call a lease if the effect created by the transaction is that of a sale. The test certainly must be applied
in accordance with the outward appearance of the facts rather than in accordance with the intent held by one or
both of the parties while creating effects contrary to those normally produced by the kind of instrument
purportedly employed by the parties.
Coogan, Some Unconventional Security Devices, supra note 3, at § 4A.01[2] n.12. See also G. GInmoR, SEranv
Imm m u; PSONAL PRopsrr § 11.2, at 338 (1965), where Professor Gilmore explains: "It is clear enough that
'intended' in [§ 1-201(37)] has nothing to do with the subjective intention of the parties, or either of them."
15. See, e.g., Leasing Serv. Corp. v. American Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 19 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 252
(D.N.J. 1976); Brown v. Baker, 688 P.2d 943 (Alaska 1984); Lease Fim., Inc. v. Burger, 40 Colo. App. 107, 575
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difference, however, between ignoring the labels that the parties attach to the
transaction and ignoring their intent entirely.16 The courts should not be misled by
what the parties call the transaction, but they also should not feel free to disregard the
economic transfer made by the parties in their contract.
As a result, it is critical for parties whose mutual subjective intent is to enter into
a true lease to make this clear in their documents, not merely by calling the
transaction a lease, 17 but also by structuring their exchange to include sufficient
indicia of a true lease. The problem with this requirement, as amply illustrated by the
cases discussed throughout this Article, is that it is virtually impossible to predict
what set of factors will be sufficient to convince a court that a true lease exists. By
misreading, rewriting, and falling into the holes in the current definition of security
interest, the courts have hopelessly confused the applicable standard. The current
"test" is in fact only the enumeration of an arbitrary set of factors, ostensibly based
upon indicia of ownership, identified by the courts on an ad hoc basis. 18
If the U.C.C. provided definitions of sale, lease, and security interest which
focused upon the true nature of these transactions, the problems could be resolved,
and a meaningful standard could be identified and consistently applied. But what test
should the U.C.C. provide? Expressed intent may not be the answer, but neither is
a standard that is entirely unpredictable because it focuses upon contract provisions
which can be used with equal logic in sale, lease, or security interest. Any test that
ignores the economic differences among the transactions misses their true nature. The
only appropriate test is one that focuses upon the allocation of value, represented by
the goods, which is transferred. It is this economic transfer, effected by the transaction,
which appropriately distinguishes a lease from a sale or a security interest.
To resolve the confusion created by the current version of the U.C.C., the
drafters of the U.C.C. have proposed a significant change in its scope. On August 1,
1986, the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws approved
Article 2A of the U.C.C., which governs personal property leasing transactions. 19
P.2d 857 (1977); Tishman Equip. Leasing, Inc. v. Levin, 152 Conn. 23, 202 A.2d 504 (1964); State Bank of Burleigh
County Trust Co. v. All-American Sub, Inc., 289 N.W.2d 772 (N.D. 1980).
16. Two separate issues are raised when a court decides the nature of a transaction without regard to the "intent"
of the parties. First, no court will feel bound by objective manifestations of intent in the form of the name given to the
transaction, nor by recitals of intent, nor by testimony on subjective understanding. The evidence of intent considered by
the courts is apparently limited to the terms of the agreement itself (presumably including oral agreements concerning
options and the like, which would tend to make a transaction a security interest). But something more is also at issue.
Courts which get distracted by factors such as who pays the taxes, and who owned the equipment to begin with, are
ignoring the intent of the parties at a much deeper level, since this inquiry totally misses the intended economic allocation,
which is the most fundamental basis of the exchange.
17. This is insufficient under both the 1978 version of U.C.C. § 1-201(37) and under U.C.C. § 9-102(1)(a). See
supra notes 14-15.
18. See infra text accompanying notes 78-148.
19. National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws, Boston, Mass. (Aug. 1, 1986). The history
of the adoption of U.C.C. Article 2A is, to say the least, a complex one. In 1982, Ronald DeKoven, the Reporter for
Article 2A, was retained to draft a uniform act governing personal property leasing. That project was initially entitled,
The Uniform Personal Property Leasing Act (UPPLA). It went through a series of drafts during 1983-1985, and in August
1985, the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws voted, at its meeting in Minneapolis,
Minnesota, to approve the UPPLA. It was then decided that the subject matter was more appropriately included as a part
of the Uniform Commercial Code. Since the Uniform Commercial Code is a joint project of the Conference and the
American Law Institute (ALI), and because its governance is subject to the Permanent Editorial Board of the Uniform
19881
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The Article received the final approval of the Permanent Editorial Board of the
Uniform Commercial Code in March, 1987.20 It was then submitted to the American
Law Institute, which approved the new Article on May 22, 1987.21
As apart of proposed Article 2A of the U.C.C.,2 the drafters have also proposed
an amendment to Section 1-201(37) of the U.C.C., which defines "security inter-
est. -23 This amended definition provides a test for distinguishing between leases and
secured transactions which places the emphasis where it belongs--on the relative
economic positions of the parties as a result of the allocations made in the transaction.
Its beauty is that it focuses the attention of the courts on the same issue that draws the
attention of the participants: what economic value represented by the goods is being
transferred from the seller to the buyer, or from the lessor to the lessee, or from the
debtor to the secured party? As a result, its application reaches results based upon the
same distinctions that have been considered by the participants in choosing among the
available options.
Until Article 2A, there has been no comprehensive law of personal property
leasing. The Consumer Leasing provisions of the Consumer Credit Protection Act24
represent only a small portion of the law on the issue. There are various state statutes
governing personal property leasing,25 but there has been no uniform set of guidelines
to assist the courts in understanding the true nature of a sale, a lease, and a security
interest.
In the absence of such comprehensive legislation, lingering and troublesome
questions have developed over the applicability of Articles 2 and 9 of the U.C.C. to
personal property leases. For many years, courts have wrestled with the application
of Articles 2 and 9 to leasing, focusing primarily on financed sales that take the form
of long-term leases.
Nothing in the present Code directly addresses the rights and obligations of a
lessor and lessee, analogous to the coverage for sales given in Article 2. Many courts
have been unable to reach the obvious conclusion that, however unfair the result may
be, the express protections of Article 2 do not directly apply to leases. Because
Commercial Code, it was necessary to present the Proposed Article to all three bodies for approval. See generally Article
2A, supra note 3, § 2A-101, Official Comment, History.
20. Meeting of the Permanent Editorial Board of the Uniform Commercial Code, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania,
March 1987.
21. American Law Institute, Annual Meeting, Washington, D.C., May 22, 1987. The draft before the ALI was
denominated, Article 2A. Leases (with Conforming Amendments to Articles I and 9), Proposed Final Draft (April 6,
1987). The Final Draft approved by the Institute was final in name only. Certain minor changes in the text were approved
by the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws (NCCUSL) at their annual meeting in August
1987. The Council of the American Law Institute and the Permanent Editorial Board of the Uniform Commercial Code
appointed a committee to work with the Reporter to make minor changes in the text and comments, as they deemed
appropriate, to reflect the discussion of Article 2A before the ALI, and the changes adopted by NCCUSL. It is this final
version, and not the "Final Draft" presented to the ALI, which is the Official Text of Article 2A.
22. American Law Institute, U.C.C. Article 2A, Leases. Proposed Final Draft (April 6, 1987). This project was
formerly identified as the Uniform Personal Property Leasing Act. See supra note 19.
23. Proposed Amendment, U.C.C. § 1-201(37), supra note 3.
24. 15 U.S.C. § 1667a-1667e (1982).
25. See, e.g., CAL. CIV. CoDE § 3308 (West Supp. 1986) (lessor's damages for lessee's breach of personal property
lease); Mo. Fir. lrsr. CoDE Ar. §§ 3-206(b)(8), 3-605 (1980 & 1986 Supp.) (regulation of personal property leasing by
state chartered banks).
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Article 2A parallels most of the provisions of Article 2, the adoption of Article 2A
should lay to rest much of the controversy concerning the applicability of Article 2
to leases.
Article 9 provides only a frail framework for distinguishing between a lease and
a secured transaction, stating that it governs any transaction "intended to create a
security interest." ' 26 While the current definition of "security interest" 27 recognizes
the use of financing leases as a mechanism for creating a security interest, this
definition has raised more questions than it answers. The Proposed Amendment to
Section 1-201(37)28 does away with the "intent" standard in the definition of a
security interest, focusing instead upon the facts of each case. 29 But the Proposed
Amendment goes on to provide specific guidelines to be applied to the transaction,
that reflect the inherent economic distinctions between leases and secured transac-
tions. As a result of this change, the parties to lease transactions will be able to
anticipate and satisfy the test that will be applied to their agreement, no longer subject
to an indeterminate common law standard of "intent."
Article 2A is an important development in commercial law. But the value of this
change in the law of personal property leasing cannot be fully understood without a
review of the analytical morass created by the courts in interpreting the application of
Article 9 to leases.
A. A Simple Model of a Sale, a Lease, and a Secured Transaction
To understand the impact of the framework provided by proposed Article 2A, it
is necessary to make some basic assumptions about the true nature of a sale and a
lease as distinct transactions in their simplest forms.
First, in an unconditional sale, the buyer gets to keep the goods. The seller
exchanges his or her right to the value represented by the goods for the value of the
right to obtain payment. The buyer makes the reverse exchange. If the buyer fails to
make good on this payment obligation, the seller may pursue the buyer, but may not
pursue any specific right to the goods. By unconditional sale, the seller gives up all
previous rights in the goods.
Second, in a lease, the lessor gets the goods back. The lessor exchanges the
value represented by the right to use of the goods for the value represented by
payment. The lessee agrees to make payment for the use of the goods. 30 Whether the
26. U.C.C. § 9-102(1)(a). See also U.C.C. § 1-201(37), which provides: "Whether a lease is intended as security
is to be determined by the facts of each case ....
27. U.C.C. § 1-201(37).
28. Discussed supra in text accompanying notes 14-18, and infra text accompanying notes 78-148.
29. See Proposed Amendment, U.C.C. § 1-201(37), supra note 3, Official Comment, which states:
Reference to the intent of the parties to create a lease or security interest has led to unfortunate results. In
discovering intent, courts have relied upon factors that were thought to be more consistent with sales or loans
than leases. Most of these criteria, however, are as applicable to true leases as to security interests. ....
Accordingly, amended Section 1-201(37) deletes all reference to the parties' intent.
Id.
30. Although it seems clear that rent is a payment only for possession and the right to use the goods during the lease
term, this concept is frequently confused. For an excellent analysis of this issue, see Coogan, Some Unconventional
Security Devices, supra note 3, at § 4A.06[l] where the author states:
The great majority of leases of personal property serve the traditional purposes of chattel lease: they supply, for
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lessee makes the lease payments or not, eventually the goods are returned to the
lessor. By lease, the lessor does not give up this residual value31 of the goods, but
only the right to their use during the period of the lease.
As an attempt to distinguish between a sale and a lease transaction, these
distinctions may at first blush appear too simple to provide any guidance. We are,
after all, still dealing with the clearcut examples of the red and blue cards. But these
distinctions focus attention where it belongs--on the true allocation of economic
value effected by the transaction. As the transactions become more complex, these
indicia will help to point out the inherent differences among transactions as they begin
to approach one another.
Finally, in a secured transaction, the debtor exchanges the value represented by
unconditional ownership of the goods for the value represented by the secured party's
a price called rent, temporary use of property. The price paid, in the form of rent, is for temporary use of an
item which itself must be returned to the lessor at the end of the term . ... The use by the lessee of the
equipment for a term less than its useful life and the obligation to return it to the lessor while it still has value
are the distinguishing characteristics of a lease, just as an obligation to pay the full purchase price and so acquire
substantially all the benefits and risks of being the owner are the distinguishing characteristics of a sale.
Id. See also ProposedAmendment, U.C.C. § 1-201(37), supra note 3, Official Comment ("If a transaction creates a lease
and not a security interest, the lessee's interest in the goods is limited to its leasehold estate; the residual interest in the
goods belongs to the lessor."); In re Gehrke Enter., 1 Bankr. 647 (Bankr. W.D. Wis. 1979). (In a tine lease, the lessor
seeks to dispose of the use of the property while retaining the incidents of ownership; in a security lease, the lessor seeks
to dispose of most or all of the incidents of ownership while retaining only a sufficient interest in the property to assure
repayment of the obligation.).
31. The term "residual value" is used throughout this Article to refer to the value represented by the goods after
the transaction has been completed. It is essential to understand that the term is not used in its usual sense. It is not meant
to be synonymous with the reversionary interest which returns to a lessor upon completion of the lease term, although this
Article's definition of residual value would encompass this reversionary interest. See Boss, Lease Chattel Paper: Unitary
Treatment of a "Special" Kind of Commercial Specialty, 1983 Duas L.J. 69 (discussing the reversionary interest in lease
transactions). Nor is this term being used as it is used in Article 2A. Article 2A, supra note 3, 2A-103(l)(q) defines the
"lessor's residual interest" as the interest of the lessor in the goods after expiration, termination, or cancellation of the
lease contract. See also Proposed Amendment, U.C.C. § 1-201(37), supra note 3, Official Comment ("If a transaction
creates a lease and not a security interest, the lessee's interest in the goods is limited to its leasehold estate; the residual
interest in the goods belongs to the lessor.").
Rather, for the purpose of the economic analysis undertaken in this Article, the term "residual value" is used to
include all value remaining in the goods after the transaction is complete, whether that value belongs ultimately to the
lessor or to the lessee. For example, the residual value of a coat after a cash purchase is the value of a new coat. The
residual value of a car after a thirty-six month lease is the value of a thirty-six month old car. According to this analysis,
if we can determine who has the right to the residual value at the end of the transaction, we can determine whether the
transaction is a sale, a lease, or a security interest.
The term "residual value" does not include any loss of value arising from the transaction itself. In a simple sale,
virtually all value is residual: the value of the goods does not normally decrease by passage from the seller to the buyer.
Of course, this is not always the case; the market value of a new car in the hands of the dealer is traditionally higher than
its value in the hands of its first owner, even immediately after the sale. In a secured transaction, the residual value is the
value represented by the goods after all payment has been made, either according to the security agreement, or the surplus
which is available after default, repossession, and sale. The point is that one cannot accurately identify a transaction until
one knows who owns the value that remains when the terms of the transaction are complete. It is this value remaining at
the close of the transaction (whether by expiration, termination, or cancellation) to which the term "residual value"
refers.
This concept of residual value is most easily understood when applied to the value of goods after the lease contract
has been completed. During the period of use, leased goods may increase or decrease in value, or the value may remain
the same. The value of use belongs to the lessee during the period of the lease, but, in a true lease, the residual value
always belongs to the lessor. See Proposed Amendment, U.C.C. § 1-201(37), supra note 3, Official Comment. It is this
more limited sense in which the term is used in Article 2A. See Article 2A, supra note 3, § 2A-103(l)(q). On the issue
whether this residual value should be judged as anticipated by the parties at the time they enter into the transaction, see
infra note 58 and text accompanying notes 63-66. On the issue of rising and falling market value during the lease term,
see infra note 98.
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extention of credit. That is, the debtor gives up ownership of all of the value
represented by the goods, and grants an interest in the goods to the secured party. The
secured party gives up the value of the credit extended in exchange for the value of
the debtor's obligation, coupled with the value of an interest in the goods. The debtor
is entitled to uninterrupted use and enjoyment of the goods as long as the payments
are made.
The right transferred to the secured party is conditional in nature. While the
secured party holds a property interest in the goods, the right to realize on this interest
is contingent upon the debtor's default under the security agreement; only when a
default occurs can the secured party interfere with the debtor's use and enjoyment of
the goods. In effect, the property interest provides assurance that the debtor will
honor the payment obligation. The secured party is entitled to payment or to the value
represented by the goods, but not both. 32 Further, the secured party is not entitled to
possession of the goods unless and until there has been a failure to pay-that is, a
default-by the debtor.33
The secured transaction, in its most basic form, is therefore distinguishable from
both an unconditional sale and a lease. In a simple sale, all value represented by the
property vests in the buyer. Neither a seller nor an unsecured financer has any rights
specific to those goods. 34 In a lease, two parties share the value represented by the
goods-the lessee obtains the right to use, and the lessor retains the residual value
after the period of use is over. In a secured transaction, the debtor holds the value of
the goods, subject only to the contingent right of the secured party to claim it in the
event of nonpayment.
Next, one must decide whether these three transactions are mutually exclusive.
Identifying the true nature of each transaction is manifestly more difficult when
elements of more than one category of transfer are present in the same transaction.
The following is a basic description of possible transactions:
32. That is, the secured party is entitled to only one satisfaction of the debt. The secured party may obtain it through
payments, or through realization on the collateral, or even realization plus deficiency, but cannot realize on the collateral
without applying the value obtained through this process to the debt. See U.C.C. § 9-504(l)(b).
33. The simplification in the text is intentional in order to focus upon the true nature of a secured transaction. It
is true that the law may permit recovery of the goods for reasons other than failure to pay. The security agreement may
provide that acts by the debtor, other than nonpayment, constitute default giving rise to a right to possession. But these
acts are directly related to the prospect of payment, and as such, subsumed in the secured party's right to payment. For
example, failure to maintain or insure the collateral may constitute a breach under the security agreement. Although not
immediately apparent, this obligation is closely related to the debtor's obligation to pay, because it represents his
obligation to protect the collateral for the secured party's future protection against nonpayment. The secured party is not
primarily interested in the collateral, nor in its maintenance, but rather in his right to obtain payment. His contingent right
to realize on the collateral is only of interest to him if he does not receive payment. Absent a right to recover the goods
in the event of default, no value is passed to the secured creditor by the debtor's obligation to insure or maintain the
collateral. Indeed, there is an argument that the primary value of a security interest is not its insurance value, which
provides payment in the event that the debtor fails to pay, but its leverage value, permitting the secured creditor to insure
payment by threatening the debtor with the loss of the use of the collateral. Regardless of the analysis used, the result is
the same: the secured party's prospect of being paid is enhanced by the existence of the security interest.
34. For simplicity, this Article avoids the other legal processes by which a party other than the buyer/owner may
have rights to the goods, such as the right of a judgment creditor to force sale of the goods levied upon to satisfy the
judgment, or the right of a seller to replevy goods. See U.C.C. § 2-702. The focus instead is upon the nature of
transactions in which rights to the goods pass voluntarily from one party to another.
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(1) There can be a simple sale without a security interest. This would include
such transactions as a sale of goods for cash or a sale of goods for unsecured credit.
When the buyer obtains goods through a sale, whether for cash or unsecured
credit, the value of that property is obtained, and the seller does not retain any value
in the goods sold. 35 The seller trades her value in the goods for the proceeds, whether
the proceeds take the form of cash, a check, an open account, or a note. All value in
the goods passes to the buyer. This is true even when the sale is financed by someone
other than the seller, as when the purchase is made with a credit card.
In this exchange, the rights of the buyer and seller are governed by Article 2 of
the U.C.C. Nothing in Article 2 upsets the basic notion that this transaction is a
transfer of the value of the goods from the seller to the buyer. 36
(2) There can be a secured transaction without a sale. Rights to the goods are
voluntarily transferred from the owner to the secured party. But the secured party's
right to realize on the goods is contingent, intended to secure payment of money. 37
(3) There can be a sale combined with a secured transaction. The secured party
(either the seller or a third party financer) obtains a contingent interest in the goods
voluntarily from the buyer, in conjunction with the passage of the goods from the
seller to the buyer. The seller qua seller has given up all interest in the goods. The
seller or financer, as secured party, obtains an interest in the goods, but only to secure
performance of the buyer/debtor's payment obligation. 38
35. See supra note 34.
36. There are exceptions in Article 2 that give the seller rights in the goods even in an unconditional sale. See, e.g.,
U.C.C. § 2-702 (seller has the right to reclaim goods delivered on credit while the buyer was insolvent). Creation of an
exception for insolvency illustrates the general rule of Article 2: the seller gives up all rights in the goods upon delivery.
37. See U.C.C. § 9-105(l)(d), which defines the debtor as the party who owes payment or other performance of
the obligation that is the subject of the security interest. As discussed supra note 33, the debtor's obligation may literally
require the debtor to do things in addition to making payment. See, e.g., U.C.C.§ 9-503.
38. There are, of course, complex issues arising under the Holder in Due Course (HDC) doctrine of U.C.C. Article
3, and the rights of a debtor to raise defenses against the secured party notwithstanding HDC status under the Federal
Trade Commission (FrC) Holder in Due Course Rule, 16 C.F.R. § 433.2 (1986), the Uniform Consumer Credit Code
(1974) or other relevant state legislation. These aspects have been ignored here since they artificially combine rights
arising from two separate transactions in an effort to protect the buyer from the otherwise existing inability to combine
the rights arising in these transactions.
The question is this: Under what circumstances can the defenses, arising from the transfer/sale of property, be raised
against the party to whoni the debt is owed? The problems arise not from a relationship between the sale and the secured
transaction, but from the necessary connection between the payment obligation and the sale on one hand, and the payment
obligation and the secured transaction on the other. At the most fundamental level, the question is, "when can I raise
defenses to my payment obligation against the secured party which arise exclusively from my transaction with the seller?"
The solutions that have been devised recognize the distinct nature of these transactions.
This problem arises because a seller may freely transfer the right to payment while retaining concomitant obligations
to the buyer. When assignment of a debt in the form of a negotiable instrument, or even a debt and security interest as
represented by chattel paper, is viewed as distinct from assignment of the contract obligation as a whole, there is a
fundamental recognition of the severability of the entitlement to payment from the continuing obligations of the seller. It
is the transfer of the payment obligation which raises this problem, and not any necessary connection between the sale
and the security interest. Under the U.C.C. Holder in Due Course doctrine, transfer of the payment obligation separate
from the contract obligation may cut off defenses arising from the underlying transaction. This concept is also codified
in U.C.C. § 9-206 (permitting waiver of defenses in a secured transaction); the FTC Holder in Due Course Rule; and the
UNrW. CONsUMRM CiRErr CODE §§ 3.307 and 3.404 (1974).
For example, while the law may permit a buyer to refuse payment to a secured creditor in some circumstances based
upon a failure of the goods, this right is exclusively defensive. No court would permit a suit by the buyer as plaintiff
against the secured party as defendant based upon breach of warranty by the seller. The proper defendant in such an action
is the seller, and not the secured party. Thus, the law recognizes that these rights arise against separate parties based upon
distinct transactions, regardless of their interaction when the obligation of payment has been transferred from seller to
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These descriptions indicate that elements of a sale and a secured transaction may
exist as parts of the same exchange. This is inherent in the concept of secured
transactions. However, it is essential to understand that these aspects of the
transaction are distinct, and that each element (sale and security interest) is separate,
giving rise to rights and liabilities independent of the other. 39 For example, the buyer
who purchases goods expects the seller to comply with Article 2 of the U.C.C. The
seller may have obligations with respect to the quality of the goods. If the buyer
obtains secured financing from a third party, that secured party undertakes no
obligations under Article 2. The financer is not responsible for the quality of the
goods. The sale aspect of the transaction is wholly separate from the rights and
liabilities of the secured party.
On the other hand, the secured party is obligated to comply with the provisions
of Article 9 of the U.C.C., while the seller has no such obligations. When these
transactions are combined into one, so that the seller is also a secured party, this
distinction remains: the seller qua seller is liable under Article 2 only, and the seller
qua secured party is liable under Article 9 only.
(4) Another possible transaction is the lease of goods. No single transaction can
be both a sale and a lease of the same goods. A sale is an unconditional exchange of
the value of the goods for payment. A lease is an exchange of the right to use of goods
for payment. Since the right to use the goods is presumably included in their sale, it
is anomalous to suggest that the seller could obtain payment both for the uncondi-
tional transfer of the goods, and for their use after transfer. The reverse is also true.
If the transaction is a lease, it is only use which is exchanged for payments, and not
the unconditional right to-the goods. 40
(5) Finally, no single transaction can create both a lease and a security interest
in the same goods. Since in a security transaction there is only a contingent right to
secured party. A case which focuses upon this distinction in a disguised lease transaction is Chemical Bank v. Rinden
Professional Ass'n, 126 N.H. 688, 498 A.2d 706 (1985). In that case, a law firm obtained a telephone system through
a lease-purchase agreement from a supplier. The supplier then assigned the lease to Chemical. The assignment was
accompanied by a waiver of defenses agreement by Rinden. When Rinden refused to pay the assignee, the assignee filed
suit. Rinden attempted to raise defenses against the assignee arising from the sale transaction, arguing that the waiver of
defenses and consent to assignment provisions were unconscionable. The court found that the transaction was a disguised
security agreement, subject to Article 9, and that a sale had occurred, so that Article 2 was also applicable. Id. at 693,
696, 498 A.2d at 711, 713. It held that the assignment complied with the provisions of both Articles 2 and 9, that the
waiver of defenses against the assignee was enforceable, and that the assignee was a holder in due course, free of the
defenses arising from the sale transaction. The lessee could have pursued remedies against the supplier under Article 2,
but as so often happens, the supplier had filed bankruptcy. Id. at 697, 498 A.2d at 714. By a finding that the assignee
was an HDC, the court recognized that the assignee obtained the payment obligation and the security interest, but not the
underlying obligation which gave rise to Rinden's defenses in this action.
39. The suggestion is not that the same contract cannot include elements of both transactions, but rather that each
transaction is distinct and exclusive. A lease with a subsequent sale of leased goods is two transactionsr, a lease, and a
sale. It is not possible (for the reasons addressed in the text) for the same transfer to effect both a sale and a lease. A
"sale-leaseback" transaction raises an interesting problem. In such cases, the lessee is the original owner of the goods,
who transfers them to the lessor, and then leases them back. If the transaction is a true sale and lease, then there are two
distinct transactions: the sale of the goods from the seller/lessee to the new owner/lessor, and the lease of those goods back
from lessor to lessee. But if the transaction is a disguised security interest, then there is only one transaction: the grant
of a security interest in the goods from the nominal lessee to the nominal lessor.
40. See supra note 30.
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realize on the goods, the secured party cannot at the same time also hold the
unconditional right to return of the goods which characterizes the rights of a lessor.41
B. Economic Transfer in Sale, Lease, and Security Interest
Another way to characterize the distinction between a sale, a lease, and a
security interest is to identify the holder of the residual economic value42 represented
by the goods when the transaction is complete. In a simple sale, the residual value
passes unconditionally to the buyer. The seller does not get the goods back; the
residual value is wholly owned by the buyer when the transaction is concluded.
In a secured transaction, the buyer retains the residual value in the goods and the
secured party has contingent access to it only in the event of breach, and only to the
extent of the remaining debt.43 Article 9 recognizes that this residual value remains
the property of the debtor even after breach, by requiring the secured party to account
to the debtor for any surplus after the debt is extinguished. 44
In a true lease transaction, however, the residual value of the goods returns to
the lessor. 45 If the payments are made, the residual value returns at the end of the
lease term. If the payments are not made, the residual value returns earlier. But by
definition, a true lease gives the lessee no claim to that residual value that is
comparable to the rights of a debtor to the surplus under Article 9.46 Absent a
41. See DeKoven, Leases of Equipment: Puritan Leasing Company v. August, A Dangerous Decision, 12 U.S.F.
L. Rav. 257 (1978). There is an argument that the right to repossess leased goods upon nonpayment of rent is identical
in economic terms to a security interest, because it secures payment of the rent, and is contingent upon default. But this
right should be categorized differently. Since rent entitles the lessee to retain possession and use of the leased property,
a failure to pay rent terminates the lessee's right. All residual, including the right to possession and use, reverts to the
lessor, not to secure a continuing payment obligation, but to return this residual to its rightful owner. Upon return of the
goods, the lessor is only entitled to be made whole for the use which has been uncompensated, and for other damages
related to the default. See infra note 46 which discusses damages upon default. No one would argue that, in a true lease,
the lessor is obligated to sell the property to recover damages from the breach of the lease.
42. Residual value is defined as the value remaining in the goods after the transaction is completed. See supra
note 31.
43. But see U.C.C. § 9-505(2), which permits the secured party in certain circumstances to retain the collateral in
full satisfaction of the debt. Since the debtor has the right to prevent this action, even this Code provision recognizes the
debtor's ultimate ownership of that residual value. Presumably if the residual value is greater than the debt, the debtor
will insist upon disposition. After the debt to the secured creditor has been satisfied, the surplus must be delivered to the
debtor. See U.C.C. § 9-504(2).
44. See U.C.C. § 9-504(2). See generally Ayer, On the Vacuity, supra note 3.
45. See DeKoven, supra note 41, at 279 ("In a true lease the lessor's mitigation is limited to the reasonable value
of the use of the equipment for the term. ... ).
46. Although it is beyond the scope of this Article to discuss at length the differences between the remedies
available to a lessor at common law and those available under Part 5 of Article 9, there are two relevant points that can
be made. First, a true lessor is the owner of the residual economic value under the lease. The lessee has no right to demand
upon default that the lessor dispose of the leased goods, and as a result, the lessor need not account to the lessee for this
value on default. See DeKoven, supra note 41, at 266-68; DeKoven, Proceedings After Default By the Lessee Under a
True Lease of Equipment, in IC BsNDER's UNiFoRM Co.mm\rsaA. CoD SEsics, SEcuRED TRa.asAcnoqs Ch. 29B at
§ 29B.03[2]. Professor Coogan explained it this way: "What might be thought of as the collateral--he equipment-
belongs to the lessor, not the lessee. It makes no sense to tell the lessor to sell his own property in order to collect the
lessee's obligation to him." Coogan, Is There a Difference?, supra note 3, at § 4AA.03[1]. On the other hand, since a
-lessee under a disguised security interest is the owner of the residual economic value, the application of Article 9 to this
transaction would require the nominal lessor to apply the amount received on disposition of the property to any deficiency,
or to account to the nominal lessee for any surplus. See U.C.C. § 9-504. Proposed Amendment, U.C.C. § 1-201(37),
supra note 3, Official Comment.
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subsequent purchase of the goods by the lessee, the lessor remains the holder of the
residual value of leased goods.
Once again, it is apparent from the analysis of residual value that no transaction
can effect both a lease and a security interest in the same goods. The lessor's right to
return of the goods is conditional during the period of the lease, because it is
conditioned upon default. But when the term of the lease is complete, the true lessor
is unconditionally entitled to return of the residual value.47 On the other hand, while
the secured party's right to the goods during the term of the security interest is
conditional upon payment, once payment is complete, the secured party's contingent
right to the goods is extinguished, and all residual value in the goods belongs to the
debtor.
C. The Importance of Obligation in the Analysis
This discussion raises an important related point. Even under the current
definition of "security interest," 48 a court is justified in finding that a security
interest exists only when the transaction terms impose upon the nominal lessee an
absolute obligation to pay. This so-called "hell or high water" clause is the sine qua
non to a finding that the transaction is a disguised security interest; no security interest
exists if the obligation of the lessee under the lease is terminable. 49
For example, if the lessee has the right at any time during the transaction to
return the goods, with no obligation to make future payments under the lease
agreement, this cannot constitute a sale and security interest. 50 From the discussion
of the economic allocation effected by a sale, it is clear that a court cannot find that
the lessee is the holder of the residual value, and therefore a de facto purchaser,
unless the lessee is unconditionally obligated to complete payments for the transfer of
the goods. If the lessee can walk away from the transaction with no further obligation,
it is not a purchase subject to a security interest, but a true lease. Although some cases
have ignored this factor, 5' these holdings are inconsistent with the most basic aspect
47. Of course, if the lease contains an option to buy, even the true lessor does not have an unconditional right to
return of the residual value. The lessor has the right either to return of the goods or to payment for their residual value,
once again establishing the true lessor as the owner of the residual value. For a more thorough analysis of this problem,
see infra text accompanying notes 53-76.
48. U.C.C. § 1-201(37).
49. Coogan made this point quite forcefully in his discussion of In re Royer's Bakery, 1 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 342
(Callaghan) (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1963) (decided by referee):
A surprising aspect of the referee's opinion was that in holding the transaction to be a conditional sale he
attached no significance to the fact that the lessee had an option to terminate at any time, a term hardly
characteristic of a sale and a crucial fact that under black-letter pre-Code law would have led to an opposite
result.
Coogan, Some Unconventional Security Devices, supra note 3, at § 4A.01[2][c][vi][A].
50. See, e.g., In re Marhoefer Packing Co., 674 F.2d 1139 (7th Cir. 1982); RCA Corp. v. State Tax Comm'n, 513
S.W.2d 313 (Mo. 1974); U.S. Fidelity and Guar. Co. v. Thompson and Green Mach. Co., Inc., 568 S.W.2d 821 (renn.
1978); In re Coors of the Cumberland, Inc., 19 Bankr. 313 (Bankr. M.D. Tenn. 1982); Arnold Mach. Co. v. Balls, 624
P.2d 678 (Utah 1981).
51. See, e.g., In re J.A. Thompson & Son, Inc., 665 F.2d 941 (9th Cir. 1981); In re Vaillancourt, 7 U.C.C. Rep.
Serv. (Callaghan) 748 (Bankr. D. Me. 1970) (decided by referee); In re Royer's Bakery, Inc., 1 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 342
(Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1963) (decided by referee). See supra note 49. The cases that have so held have relied upon the existence
of a nominal price option, holding that the existence of such an option creates a security interest under § 1-201(37) as a
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of the true nature of a sale (that the residual value is unconditionally transferred to the
buyer), and also with the true nature of a security interest (that the secured party has
only a contingent right to the residual). When there is no obligation to continue
making payments under the "lease," the transaction must necessarily be a true lease,
since the residual remains at all times with the lessor, and the lessee has undertaken
no obligation to purchase this residual. 52
We cannot, however, reverse the logic to find-a true lease only in those cases
when the payment obligation is terminable. Either type of payment obligation-
terminable or absolute-is consistent with the existence of a true lease. For example,
a true lease may contain a clause that permits the lessee, upon return of the leased
goods, to avoid any further payment obligation. This is a terminable contract to lease
the use value of the goods-one form of a true lease. A true lease might also include
an obligation which is absolute, requiring the lessee to continue making payments
even when the goods are returned. The reason for this is quite simple: the lessee in
a true lease is contracting only for the possession and use of the goods during the lease
term. The parties may agree that payment for this use is either a terminable or an
unconditional obligation, but it does not change the economic allocation. In either
case, the lessee is contracting only for use, and not for the residual. As a result, while
a terminable obligation is incompatible with the true nature of a security interest, a
true lease is compatible with either a terminable or an absolute payment term.
In summary, the true nature of each of these transactions makes them distinct
and independent. A lease is not a sale, a sale is not a secured transaction, and a
secured transaction is not a lease. While we may combine the concepts of sale and
security interest in a single transaction, these are separate aspects of the relationship
between the parties. However, we may not, in a single transfer, combine a lease with
either a sale or a security interest, because the true nature of a lease is incompatible
with the concepts inherent in either sale or security interest.
D. Analyzing Some Problem Transactions for Their True Nature
When these transactions appear in their simplest forms, as we have discussed
them above, and when both the parties and the documents reflect the true nature of
the transactions, no problems arise in applying the U.C.C. to the transaction. In these
cases, we can say with confidence that red is red, and blue is blue. The answer is
deceptively simple: Article 2 applies to sales, Article 9 applies to secured transac-
tions, and neither applies directly to a true lease.
Problems developed when courts analyzing more complex transactions failed to
give full effect to the distinct nature of these concepts. It is not that the parties are not
entitled to choose whatever mechanism they wish to accomplish the transfer of rights.
Rather, the problems exist because courts applying the U.C.C. to these "purple"
matter of law. See infra text accompanying notes 54-66 and notes 150-186 for a discussion of options and their effect
on the existence of a security interest.
52. The result is the same under the Proposed Amendment, which requires that the consideration paid by the lessee
not be subject to termination in order to find a security interest. See infra text accompanying note 156.
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transactions have had extreme difficulty identifying the true nature of a sale, a lease,
and a secured transaction.
Upon closer inspection, there is ample reason for confusion in the law governing
personal property. The problems become readily apparent when more complex
examples of these transactions are examined: the Option to Buy;53 the Lease to the
End of Useful Life; the Option to Renew. Each of these contract provisions raises
different questions about the categorization of the transactions. However, the true
nature of each transaction should remain the same regardless of the contract terms
used to effect the allocation. A review of the variety of means by which these terms
may operate should lead to consistent and determinable results.
1. The Option to Buy
In a simple analysis of leases the existence of a residual value at the end of the
lease term is assumed. If the residual value returns to the lessor at the end of the lease
term, that transaction qualifies as a true lease. What result if the "lease" contract
grants to the "lessee" the option to buy this residual value? Is this contract a sale with
a security interest retained by the nominal "lessor," or a true lease? There are several
possible transactions.
a. The Mandatory Option
If the contract requires the lessee to exercise the option at the end of the lease
term, the transaction is a sale. The nominal lessor in this example has not retained the
right to the residual value at the end of the lease, but has transferred all value, both
use and residual, to the lessee for a price consisting of the lease payments plus the
option payment. The lessee has undertaken the unconditional obligation to purchase
both the use and residual value of the goods. Any interest retained by the "lessor"
is a security interest-that is, a contingent right to the goods to secure payment. 54
b. Optioning Out of the Lease Obligation
Suppose the contract contains an option to purchase, but the option price permits
the lessee to purchase the residual value of the goods (including the right to use them,
of course) for less than the cost of performance for the remaining lease term. This
53. Oddly enough, once it is known whether these transactions are leases or sales, the answer to the question
whether or not there is a security interest in the goods is easy. If the answer is that the transaction is a true lease, there
can be no security interest, because no transaction can simultaneously embody both a lease (unconditional right to
possession of the goods at the end of the transaction or upon default) and a security interest (conditional right to possession
of the goods upon default). If the transaction is actually a sale, then there is also a security interest because the rights in
the goods which have been disguised as a lease represent not (as they have been represented by the parties) an absolute
right to return of the leased goods, but a contingent interest in the goods to secure payment-a security interest. See
U.C.C. § 1-201(37) (seller's reservation of title notwithstanding delivery to the buyer is limited to a security interest,
although reservation of title under a lease which is not intended as security is not a security interest); Coogan, Some
Unconventional Security Devices, supra note 3, at § 4A.01[2]. Of course, if the secured party has not taken steps to
perfect the security interest, the existence of this right may provide little solace. See infra text accompanying notes
131-48, discussing the application of Article 9 to disguised leases.
54. See, e.g., In re Coors of Cumberland, Inc., 19 Bankr. 313 (Bankr. M.D. Tenn. 1982). The result is the same
under the Proposed Amendment. See Proposed Amendment, U.C.C. § 1-201(37)(first b), supra note 3, and infra text
accompanying notes 150-89.
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would also constitute a sale.5 5 If the lessee can obtain use and residual value for less
than the cost of use alone, the economic realities of the transaction for both parties
are the same as in the mandatory option case.56 If the nominal lessor is contractually
obligated to part with the residual value for the option price alone, and the option
price is the economically favorable mechanism for the lessee to obtain the use of the
goods, then a sale has occurred. 57
c. Option Price Too Low
In this example, the contract contains a true option (that is, the lessee is under
no compulsion to exercise the option, unlike the previous two examples), but the
payment to the lessor is less than the anticipated residual value of the goods at the end
of the lease term.58 The true nature analysis suggests that this option creates a sale and
disguised security interest because the anticipated residual value of the goods is
greater than the amount paid for it. The insufficient amount of the option payment
makes clear that the lessor has already transferred ownership of the residual value to
the lessee in exchange for the lease payments. Otherwise, there is no incentive for the
lessor to have agreed to part with the residual for an amount less than its anticipated
value. In this circumstance, the lease payments presumably have compensated the
lessor for the ownership interest in the residual, and the lessee is actually a buyer,
having purchased both the use value and at least a portion of the residual value
55. Keep in mind the discussion of unconditional obligation to pay, supra text accompanying notes 48-52. When
the obligation is terminable, the cost of completing the lease is zero, since the lessee has the legal right not to make any
further payments. If the lessee has no obligation to continue making payments under the lease and can terminate the
transaction, then exercise of the option would not be for an amount less than the cost of completing the lease, and the
transaction does not fall within this hypothetical.
56. Again, the result is the same under the Proposed Amendment. See Proposed Amendment, U.C.C.
§ 1-201(37)(x)(ii), supra note 3.
57. In calculating the cost to the lessee of completing performance under the lease, one cannot compare only the
dollars paid under the option with dollars paid to complete the lease. Naturally the time value of money must also be taken
into account. Only if the option price plus interest thereon is less than completion of the lease has a security interest been
created.
58. The phrase "anticipated residual value" focuses attention on the economic expectations of the parties at the
time the lease transaction is entered into, and not the time when the option is exercised. For reasons addressed in the text
infra at notes 63-66, it is more appropriate to make this determination when the option is granted, because it is at this
point that the determination of whether a transaction is a lease or a security interest must be made. Any other timing for
this evaluation permits a lease which was believed by the parties at its inception to be a true lease, to be
"transubstantiated" into a security interest if the residual turns out to be more valuable than the parties anticipated at the
inception of the transaction. See infra text accompanying notes 106-14.
Most of the cases which have addressed this issue have compared the option price with the value of the goods at the
time the option is exercised. See, e.g., In re Reserves Dev. Corp., 36 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 1327 (Bankr. W.D.
Mo. 1983); Peco, Inc. v. Hartbauer Tool & Die Co., 262 Or. 573, 500 P.2d 708 (1972); Davis Bros. v. Misco Leasing,
Inc., 508 S.W. 2d 908 (Tex. Civ. App. 1974). None of these judges was confronted with proof of a residual value that
was nominal at the time the lease was entered into, that became a realistic measure of actual residual value by the time
of exercise, nor the reverse situation. One court has recognized that the appropriate measure for determining whether an
option is nominal is the fair market value of the leased goods as anticipated by the parties when the option is granted, and
not the actual fair market value at the time the option is exercised. See In re Marhoefer Packing Co., 674 F.2d 1139 (7th
Cir. 1982). As discussed infra text accompanying notes 63-66, if a choice must be made between residual value as
anticipated at the time of contracting or actual residual value at the time of exercise, the point of contracting gives a more
reliable standard for distinguishing between leases and secured transactions.
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through payments during the lease term. The'option payment is nothing more than the
completion of the sale of the residual value to the buyer.59
d. The Right Option Price
This contract contains a true option, and the amount of the option payment is
equal to or greater than the anticipated residual value of the lease goods. This is a true
lease and not a disguised security interest. Although it is a lease coupled with an
option to buy, these are separate transactions. The true nature of each is reflected in
the economic allocation of value under the contract. There is no sale until the option
is exercised and there is no compulsion on the lessee to exercise the option. The lessor
remains the owner of the residual value until the exercise. At this point the lessor is
fully compensated for the residual value by the option payment: the lease payments
compensate the lessor for the value of the use of the goods during the lease term, and
the option payment fully compensates the lessor (who only becomes a seller when the
option is exercised) for the residual value in the goods. 60
e. The Nominal Option Price
What if the lease contains an option price which is nominal? Much of the
discussion about option prices has centered upon the issue of whether the option price
is nominal, because the 1978 version of Section 1-201(37) states that a nominal price
option creates a security interest. 61 Unfortunately, there is no current Code definition
of nominal. Does "nominal" mean a small dollar amount, or an amount which is
small in relation to the value of the residual transferred? If the option price is less than
the anticipated residual value, we know from Example l(d) above that this is a
disguised sale and security interest.
But what if the option price is a small amount because the anticipated residual
value of the leased goods at the end of the lease term is a small dollar amount? This
should not constitute a nominal price option. So long as the option price is equal to
or greater than the residual value of the goods, the transaction remains a true lease.
The fact that only a few dollars are required to fully compensate the lessor should not
turn this into a nominal price option, and thereby, into a security interest.62
59. To the same effect, see Proposed Amendment, U.C.C. §§ 1-201(37)(first d) and (x), supra note 3. See infra
text accompanying notes 192-200.
60. See Proposed Amendment, U.C.C. § 1-201(37)(x), supra note 3, which provides:
Additional consideration is not nominal if (i) when the option to renew the lease is granted to the lessee the
rent is stated to be fair market rent for the use of the goods for the term of the renewal determined at the
time the option is to be performed, or (ii) when the option to become the owner of the goods is granted to the
lessee the price is stated to be the fair market value of the goods determined at the time the option is to be
performed....
Id. See also id., Official Comment.
61. The 1978 version of U.C.C. § 1-201(37) states that "an agreement that upon compliance with the terms of the
lease the lessee shall become or has the option to become the owner of the property for no additional consideration or for
a nominal consideration does make the lease one intended for security." See infra notes 87-113 and accompanying text
for a discussion of this provision. See also infra notes 190-217 and accompanying text for this provision's treatment under
the Proposed Amendment.
62. But the reader should be aware that a lease with a residual that is worth only a small dollar amount at the end
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This discussion leads to another important issue: When is the appropriate time
for a determination that the option price compensates the true lessor for the lessor's
residual value? The phrase "anticipated residual value" has been used because the
expectations of the parties at the time the option price is set are more relevant than
the actual residual value when the option is exercised. In a perfect world, these would
always be the same, and one would always know a true lease by comparing the option
price to the actual value of the goods at the time the option is exercised. In reality,
however, goods rise and fall in value contrary to the expectations of the parties. 63 If
one does not use the anticipated value at the time the lease with option is entered into,
then a true lease is "transubstantiated" into a disguised security interest by a rising
market, and a disguised security interest becomes a true lease in a falling market. 64
For example, suppose that the parties anticipate that the leased goods will have
a fair market value of $500 at the end of the lease term. An option in the lease
agreement grants the lessee the right to purchase the goods at the end of the lease term
for $500. Under a true nature analysis, this is a true lease, because the amount of the
option payment fully compensates the lessor for ownership of the anticipated residual
value. But suppose that the goods rise in value unexpectedly during the lease term,
so that the goods which were anticipated to be worth only $500 are now worth $1500.
If the character of the transaction is fixed at the time the option is granted, this change
in market value cannot affect the rights of the parties to the transaction. On the other
hand, a test that looks to the value of the goods at the time the option is exercised will
transform this true lease into a disguised security interest.
Application of Article 9 to such a "transformed" security interest is profoundly
troublesome. At the time the transaction is entered into, the parties have every
reason to believe that no filing is necessary, but by the time the transformation has
occurred, it is too late to file. Filing at the time when the option is exercised is
of the lease term may in fact be a lease to the end of useful life. See infra notes 67-72, 74-76, and 190-217 and
accompanying text.
63. See infra note 98 for a discussion of rising and falling market values, and their effect on lease transactions.
Professor Ayer has argued that the allocation of upside and downside risk, both indicia of ownership, make long-term
leases and sales indistinguishable. See Ayer, On the Vacuities, supra note 3, at 671-81. I do not think that the allocation
of risk should determine whether the transaction is a sale or a lease. The characterization of the transaction should remain
the same under true nature analysis whether the relevant risk is viewed as being whether the use value will rise or fall,
or the risk is whether the residual value will rise or fall. For example, in a true lease, the lessor gives up the use value
for her realistic estimate of the current and future value of the use of the goods. Even if the use value rises dramatically,
this would not change the lease from a true lease into a sale and security interest. The lessor is still the owner of the
residual value, and has parted with use for the anticipated fair market value at the inception of the transaction. The same
is true of option prices. The lessor who grants an option to buy makes a realistic evaluation of the worth of the residual
when the option will be exercised. If the goods unexpectedly rise in value, then the lessee has made a good bargain, and
will probably exercise the option, but this should not change the fact that the transaction is a true lease. The lessor asked
an option price intended to fully compensate her for the anticipated residual, and the fact that the lessor retains the
downside risk and the lessee obtains the upside benefit is irrelevant.
If an unanticipated change in market value were to change the transaction from a lease into a sale solely because the
lessor has parted with the upside benefit by granting a fixed option price, what are we to make of the transactions,
currently in vogue, wherein a seller contractually agrees to repurchase a car (or a diamond ring) for a fixed price? The
seller has retained the downside risk, but surely this does not change a transaction wherein the seller has parted with all
residual value, from a sale back into a lease!
64. See infra notes 150-89 and accompanying text discussing this timing in Proposed Amendment, U.C.C.
§ 1-201(37), supra note 3. See supra note 58 discussing the fact that many courts addressing this issue have looked to
the value of the goods at the time the option is exercised.
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pointless: if there has been no default under the agreement, upon exercise of the
option, the lessor gets the option payment and has no complaint, regardless of
whether the lease is a true or disguised lease transaction. But if the lessee has already
defaulted, the lessee's creditors or bankruptcy trustee will already be claiming that
the lessee is the owner of the leased property, so that filing at this point is too late to
protect the interests of the lessor. The evaluation of residual value should be made
according to the realistic expectations of anticipated residual value when the lease
transaction is entered into.65
The true nature analysis reinforces this result. It is only anticipated value that is
relevant in determining what economic exchange the parties have already effected by
the terms of their agreement. The fact that the actual value of the residual may rise
or fall while the option price remains stable is irrelevant. An unexpected rise in the
residual value should not transform a true lease into a sale any more than any other
option to buy creates a sale solely because the value of the item rises. There is no sale
until the option is exercised. The relevant question is not, "when will the lessee
choose to exercise the option, because it is a good deal?" but rather, "when,
considering the anticipated value of the residual, has the lessor already sold the
residual to the lessee?" If the option price is less than the anticipated residual, the
answer is that the lessor has sold the residual at the inception of the transaction, and
there never was any true lease.
The problem of recharacterizing the transaction based upon changing value of
the residual does not arise when the parties enter into a lease with no option but later
grant an option, or when they enter into a lease with an option but do not specify the
option price. 66 In either of these circumstances, the lessee has no claim to the residual
value until the price is agreed upon between the lessor and lessee. Thus, unlike the
lease in which the option price is set in the original agreement, there is no possibility
that the lessor has already transferred her interest in the residual value to the lessee
through the lease payments. The economic realities of such transactions permit the
use of the anticipated value at the time the option price is set. In either case, there is
no incentive for the lessor to agree to a price which reflects anything but the actual
value of the lessor's residual interest. Even if the lessor were to agree to such a
transfer, the recharacterization occurs at the time this "too-low" option price is set,
and it does not relate back to the beginning of the transaction.
2. Leases to the End of Useful Life
Recall that the analysis of the true nature of a lease presupposes a residual
economic value at the end of the lease term. Can a true lease exist when the term is
65. See supra notes 54-62, and infra notes 87-114, 150-89, and accompanying text.
66. In the case when there is an agreement to grant an option, but no option price is specified, U.C.C. § 2-305
might be of importance in setting the price, but this would normally result in a price that compensates the lessor for full
value of the residual. A lease that contains a formula for the option payment must be treated as one that specifies the option
price. Since the lessor is bound to transfer the residual for the amount determined by the formula, we can determine at
any point whether the formula compensates the lessor for the anticipated residual value. Most leases which use this
approach are disguised security agreements, since the formula utilized always arrives at an option price less than the cost
of completing performance under the lease transaction. See supra notes 55-57 and accompanying text.
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for the entire anticipated economic life of the goods, leaving no anticipated residual
value?67
Consider this series of hypotheticals:
a. Substantial Residual Value
Lessor enters into a one year lease of goods which are anticipated to have a three
year economic life. At the end of the year lease, the goods are returned to the lessor.
In this case, there is no question that the transaction represents a true lease, and not
a security interest. Under the true nature analysis, the lessor retains the right to the
residual economic value, in this case a value equal to at least two years of additional
use.
b. Lease to the End of Useful Life
Lessor enters into a three year lease of goods anticipated to have a three year
economic life. This transaction is a disguised security interest, because there is no
residual economic value to return to the lessor. The lessor's interest is really only a
contingent interest in the goods to secure payment, a security interest.
While it should be theoretically possible to lease to the end of useful life, the true
nature analysis requires that the right to the return of the goods represent the lessor's
right to some meaningful residual, even when the parties do not currently anticipate
that there will be any. Think of it this way: in a purchase, the buyer assumes the risk
that the goods will decline in value until they are worth nothing at the point when
payment is complete. In fact, virtually every car buyer assumes this risk. Conversely,
the buyer, as the holder of the residual value, also has the benefit of any increase in
value, even if none is anticipated at the time of the transaction. 6 In a true lease, the
lessor retains the residual value of the goods. Could not this theoretically include the
right to return of the goods, which may have risen significantly in value, even though
no residual value was anticipated at the time the lease began? The lessee is the loser
here, because it may be that the lessee could have purchased the goods outright for
an amount equal to the lease payments. A true lessee must turn over that residual
value at the end of the lease term, regardless of its value. 69
67. Professor Coogan argued that a lease could not exist when there was no residual value: "A lease is basically
an arrangement which provides for a payment called rent and which looks toward the return of the leased property to the
lessor when it still has some residual value." Coogan, Some Unconventional Security Devices, supra note 3 at § 4A.07;
Cf. In re Marhoefer Packing Co., 674 F.2d 1139 (7th Cir. 1982), where the court states:
An essential characteristic of a true lease is that there be something of value to return to the lessor after the term.
Where the term of the lease is substantially equal to the life of the leased property such that there will be nothing
of value to return at the end of the lease, the transaction is in essence a sale.
Id. at 1145 (citations omitted).
68. See generally Ayer, Further Thoughts, supra note 3; Ayer, On the Vacuity, supra note 3; Boss, Leases &
Sales, Ne'er or Where Shall the Twain Meet?, supra note 3.
69. Professor Coogan raised the problem of the Boeing 707, anticipated to have a useful life of 12 years, which
actually lasted much longer.
Had the carrier bought the plane, the installment payments would have paid the purchase price, plus carrying
charges. If lessee desires to continue use of the plane he has paid for, he must buy it or renew the lease, in either
case at a price to be negotiated with the lessor. The payments were for rent, and the plane belonged to the lessor.
Coogan, Some Unconventional Security Devices, supra note 3, at § 4A.06[l]. See also Coogan, Is There A Difference?,
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The problem is this: How do we tell the difference between a disguised sale in
which all value (both use and the residual) is passing to the lessee, and a true lease
with no anticipated residual value, in which the lessee nonetheless assumes the risk
that the property will be worth something, and that the residual, whatever its value,
must be returned to the lessor?70
If one goal of the true nature analysis is to provide a bright-line test that will end
the litigation over what is a security interest, and what is a lease, then a standard that
does not recognize true leases to the end of useful life is probably preferable. Since
I have argued that a meaningful and consistent distinction between a sale and a lease
is essential to successful operation of the U.C.C., it will not go against that principle
now.7 1 However, it should be obvious that lessors who wish to retain the potential
benefits of an upside gain in residual value may attempt to evade the effect of this rule
by presupposing a useful life beyond that which is currently realistic. By carefully
documenting an optimistic useful life, the lessors will presumably assure themselves
of protection in cases in which the residual value is really unknown. 72
c. Successive Transactions in the Same Goods
Lessor enters into a one year lease of goods anticipated to have a two year useful
life, at the end of which he enters into a one year lease with a different lessee. This
is the hard case because the first and second transactions may be identical in every
respect, yet the true nature analysis would suggest that the first transaction is a true
lease because there is residual value to be reclaimed by the lessor, while the second
transaction is really a sale and security interest, because there is no anticipated
residual value. Unless the parties use the techniques discussed in Example 2 (b) (lease
to the end of useful life), the second transaction cannot be considered a true lease.
d. Option to Renew to the End of Useful Life
Assume the same facts as Example 2 (c) above (successive transactions in the
same goods), but the original lessee under the one year lease holds an option to renew
the lease for an additional one year term. This example leads into the next category
of problem transactions, those with options to renew.
supra note 3, at §4AA.0312][c][iv]. Even though Coogan assumes that a lease to the end of useful life is a security interest,
this example argues for recognition of a true lease even when no residual value is anticipated at the initiation of the
transaction.
70. The Proposed Amendment does not recognize a true lease to the end of useful life. The Proposed Amendment
provides that a lease to the end of "economic life" (see infra note 159), or a lease with a mandatory renewal to the end
of economic life, or an option to renew to the end of economic life for nominal consideration, all create security interests,
so long as the obligation of the lessee is not terminable absent full payment. See Proposed Amendment, U.C.C.
§ 1-201(37), supra note 3, and infra notes 150-89 and accompanying text.
71. See supra note 70.
72. See supra note 69. Another mechanism which can be used to evade the effect of this rule, as it is codified in
the Proposed Amendment, U.C.C. § 1-201(37), supra note 3, is an option to purchase with no option price specified,
when the parties agree that the option price will reflect the actual value at the time the option is exercised. As discussed
infra notes 150-89 and accompanying text, this will permit the transaction to be considered a true lease for purposes of
Article 2A.
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3. Options to Renew
The option to renew the lease is merely a hybrid of the two previous examples
(lease to the end of useful life and option to buy). If the original lease term is not to
the end of useful life, then the option to renew is evaluated according to the same
standards set forth in subsection 1 above that apply to a purchase option.
a. The Mandatory Option to Renew
If the lease requires the lessee to renew, then there are two questions. First, what
is the renewal price? Second, is the renewal period to the end of useful life? Since the
result is the same whether the option is mandatory or not, each of these possibilities
will be examined separately, under the relevant example below.
b. Option to Renew for Less Than Anticipated Value
As with options to buy, the relevant question would be: Is the option price
adequate compensation for the anticipated use value for the period of renewal? If the
answer is no, then the existence of the option to renew may create a security interest
from the inception of the transaction, since the lessor is not being adequately
compensated for the residual, which in this case is categorized as the remaining use
value of the goods at the end of the original lease transaction. 73 In cases when there
is still a cognizable residual at the end of the renewal period which returns to the
lessor, can the true nature of the transaction be a security interest? The answer must
be no. If there is a meaningful residual returning to the lessor, then the transaction
must necessarily be a true lease, regardless of the relationship between the renewal
price and the anticipated value of the use during the period of renewal. In other
words, a renewal price that is below the anticipated value of the renewal term creates
a security interest only if the renewal period is to the end of useful life. So long as
there is a meaningful residual even after the renewal period is over, the renewal does
not create a security interest, either from the inception, or at the point of renewal.
c. Option to Renew for the Anticipated Value
A renewal price equal to or greater than the anticipated use value of the goods
at the end of the initial lease term does not automatically create a true lease. Again,
it is necessary to take a second step and ask if the renewal period is to the end of
useful life. If the answer to this question is no, then the original lease is a true lease,
and the renewal is also a true lease. In both cases, there is a meaningful residual
returning to the lessor.
73. The result is the same under the Proposed Amendment. See ProposedAmendment, U.C.C. § 1-201(37), supra
note 3, and the discussion of this provision infra notes 150-89 and accompanying text. The process of determining
anticipated use value is indistinguishable from the calculation of anticipated residual value in the case of an option to buy.
Indeed, the calculation of anticipated residual value will, in most cases, rely upon the anticipated use value of the goods
at the end of the initial lease term. The only ways to calculate anticipated residual value are use value and fair market
value. Since fair market value is inevitably affected by value of use, these tests would normally reach the same result.
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d. Option to Renew to the End of Useful Life
In this example, assume that the renewal price is equal to or greater than the
anticipated use value of the goods, 74 but the renewal period creates a lease to the end
of the useful life. As with renewals for less than the anticipated value of the residual,
the renewal to the end of useful life creates a security interest. In other words, every
renewal to the end of useful life, regardless of the renewal price, creates a security
interest, because there is no meaningful residual to return to the lessor at the end of
the transaction.
But at what point does this transaction become a sale and security interest: when
the initial lease granting the renewal option to the lessee is entered into, or when the
lessee renews the lease for a period which is anticipated to be the end of useful life?
Under a true nature analysis, so long as the option price is greater than or equal to the
anticipated residual value, the transaction remains a true lease until the option is
exercised. 75 This is true whether the option is to purchase or to renew. Until that time,
the lessor is still the owner of the residual value, and is being fully compensated for
this ownership upon exercise of the option.
But when the renewal period constitutes a lease to the end of the useful life, we
have an example of a chameleon lease transaction. It begins life as a true lease, but
once the option is exercised, it becomes a lease to the end of the useful life, and, thus,
a security interest. 76 This is similar to an option to purchase. When the purchase price
is greater than or equal to the anticipated residual value, the initial transaction is a true
lease, but upon exercise of the option the transaction is changed to a purchase. In
neither case does the exercise of the option result in a recharacterization of the initial
transaction: it was and remains a true lease.
On the other hand, if the option price is less than the anticipated residual value
of the goods and the renewal is to the end of useful life, the transaction is a security
interest from the inception. The original lease appears to leave the lessor a residual,
but the disparity between the anticipated value of the residual and the option price
means that the residual has actually been transferred to the lessee through the lease
payments during the initial term; payment under the renewal option merely completes
this transfer. No residual returns to the lessor, and the lessor is not adequately
compensated for the transfer of the residual, so the transaction cannot qualify as a true
lease.
The effect of an option to renew can thus be determined as follows:
Is the lease renewal period to the end of useful life?
74. As discussed in Example 3(b) supra text accompanying note 73 (option to renew for less than anticipated
value), if there is a meaningful residual at the end of the renewal period, the fact that the renewal was for less than the
anticipated use value of the goods during the period of renewal will not change the transaction into a disguised security
interest. A true lease exists whenever there is a meaningful residual which returns to the lessor at the end of the
transaction.
75. See infra notes 149-230 and accompanying text for a discussion ofProposedAmendment, U.C.C. § 1-201(37),
supra note 3.
76. See infra notes 170-73 and accompanying text for a discussion of chameleon leases, and the difference between
this process and "transubstantiation."
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YES NO
equal to or greater
than the anticipated YES
use value of goods
at the point of
renewal?
NO
E. The Issues in Personal Property Leasing Reform
As a result of the confusion over what is and what is not a lease for purposes of
applying the U.C.C., the current law of personal property transfer under the U.C.C.
is in considerable disarray. Courts have intermingled the U.C.C. and the common
law of leasing in their analysis of the distinction between leases and secured
transactions under Article 9, and by extending the common law of leasing to include
the statutory protections of Article 2.77 These attempts have not only ignored the
literal language of the U.C.C., but have exacerbated the confusion over what
constitutes a sale, a lease, or a security interest.
I. APPLYING ARTICLE 9 TO A LEASE TRANSACTION
A. The Current Law
The true nature analysis offers a consistent theory for determining when a
transaction is a lease or a security interest, based upon economic allocations effected
by the transaction. The guidance provided by the current version of the U.C.C. is far
from consistent, particularly as applied by the courts. The confusion surrounding the
application of the U.C.C. to leasing arises initially in Article 9. It is impossible to
understand the confusion created by judicial interpretation of U.C.C. Section
1-201(37) without a review of the cases that have considered the application of Article
9 to lease transactions. It is important to note at the outset that these cases do not answer
the question whether a lease is also subject to Article 2. Since it is possible to create
a security interest without finding that the lessor is also a seller, not every security
77. It is beyond the scope of this Article to discuss in detail the application of Article 2 to leases. Suffice it to say
that many courts have been motivated to apply Article 2 to leases in an attempt to extend to lessors the protections for
buyers under Article 2. As a result, many of the cases that interpret the current definition of security interest do not directly
raise Article 9 issues, but rather issues of warranty and unconscionability. Since a finding that a security interest exists
presupposes that there has been a sale, courts find their way into Article 2 in many cases by holding that the transaction
is a disguised security interest. But a finding that the lessor is a secured party is not necessarily a finding that the lessor
is a seller subject to Article 2. See infra notes 78-79.
Original lease is Original lease is
a true lease. a true lease.
Renewal creates a Renewal is a true
security interest, lease.
Transaction is a Original lease is
security interest a true lease.
from the
inception. Renewal is a true
lease.
| ||I17%. It'% ||I' %A/Z.ll |III[ 1"%.
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interest disguised as a lease subjects the lessor to liability under Article 2.7 8 However,
every disguised lease is a security interest, subjecting the lessor to Article 9. 79
A court determination that a lease is a disguised security interest subject to
Article 9 will have a profound impact upon the rights of the lessor. If a court finds
that a transaction is a true lease, the filing of a financing statement is not necessary
to protect the lessor's interest in the leased goods, 80 and the goods are not subject to
the claims of the lessee's creditors. 81 However, the lessor in a disguised lease
78. See Leasco Data Processing Equip. Corp. v. Starline Overseas Corp., 74 Misc. 2d 898, 346 N.Y.S.2d 288
(1973). It is possible for a security interest to be disguised as a "sale and leaseback" transaction, when the only sale is
from the nominal "lessee" to the "lessor." This transaction creates a security interest in previously owned property, with
no Article 2 implications for the lessor, since the nominal lessee in this transaction occupies the role of seller, and not the
lessor. Most of the cases in this section deal with transactions that are both sales and security interests, and thus are subject
to both Article 2 and Article 9. But absent a sale, Article 2 does not govern the transaction, and a determination that a
transaction is subject to Article 9 does not automatically trigger application of Article 2. Indeed, even when the court finds
that a lease transaction is actually a sale with retention of security interest, the lessor may be a financer who has no Article
2 liability, but nevertheless has all of the obligations of a secured party under Article 9. In this case, Article 9 would apply
to the obligation of the lessor/financer, but Article 2 would apply to the obligation of the supplier of the leased equipment.
See, e.g., Werber v. Mercedes-Benz of N. Am., 152 Cal. App. 3d 1039, 199 Cal. Rptr. 765 (1984); Atlas Indus., Inc.
v. National Cash Register Co., 216 Kan.2d 224, 531 P.2d 41 (1975). Cf. Earman Oil Co. v. Burroughs Corp., 625 F.2d
1291 (5th Cir. 1980) (whether the transaction was a true lease or a finance lease, the supplier of goods had sufficiently
disclaimed warranty liability under Article 2); CiT Fin. Serv. v. Gott, 5 Kan. 2d 224, 615 P.2d 774 (1980) (court held
that supplier, not lessor, had been the seller of the goods for Article 2 purposes).
Under Article 2A, it is possible to create a true finance lease that does not give rise to any warranty liability for the
financer, and the liability of the supplier of the goods is passed through the financer to benefit the ultimate lessee. See
Article 2A, supra note 3, §§ 2A-103(l)(g) (definition of finance lease); 2A-103(l)(x) (definition of supplier); 2A-209
(which provides for the pass-through of liability in a finance lease from the supplier to the lessee); and §§ 2A-211 through
2A-213 (the warranty provisions, that exclude finance leases).
79. See supra notes 30-41 and accompanying text, noting that a security interest and a lease cannot exist
simultaneously in the same goods in the same transaction. Although it is possible for a secured party to hold a security
interest in a lease, the lessor cannot be both a secured party in the goods, and also a lessor. Since a lessor retains the
residual economic value in the goods, and a secured party retains only a contingent interest in the goods to secure
payment, these transactions are mutually exclusive.
Not every security interest created by the application of U.C.C. § 1-201(37) is a security interest under Article 9.
For example, a security interest may be created under Article 8. See Coogan, Some Unconventional Security Devices,
supra note 3, at § 4A.01[5][c][i]. If the intent of the transaction was to create an unconditional obligation on the part of
the lessee to pay, coupled with a property interest in the lessor, then the retention of title by the lessor should create a
security interest to which Article 9 applies. Id.
80. U.C.C. § 9-408 and Official Comment 2. See Proposed Amendment, U.C.C. § 1-201(37), supra note 3,
Official Comment, andArticle 2A, supra note 3, § 2A-101, Official Comment. The drafters of Article 2A did not require
public notice for leases which fall within its terms. See Article 2A, supra note 3, § 2A-101, Official Comment, which
states in part:
Filing: The lessor is not required to file a financing statement against the lessee or take any other action to protect
the lessor's interest in the goods (Section 2A-301). The refined definition of security interest will more clearly
signal the need to file to potential lessors of goods. Those lessors who are concerned will file a protective
financing statement (Section 9-408).
Id. Ronald DeKoven, the Reporter for Article 2A, stated before the American Law Institute that one of the reasons filing
was not required for true leases is that the failure to file would impose a penalty against a lessor which might be
inappropriate, including loss of the residual to competing creditors of the lessee. DeKoven explained that optional filing
under U.C.C. § 9-408 is obviously encouraged for all long-term leases. ALI Meeting, May 22, 1987, Washington, D.C.
There has been some discussion that much of the confusion over leases and security interests could have been
resolved by requiring the filing of a notice under Article 9 for all leases over one year. See Coogan, Some Unconventional
Security Devices, supra note 3, at §§ 4A.01[4][i] and 4A.06[5]. Although this would not have subjected the leases to
Article 9 for all purposes (including, of course, the all-important remedies of Part 5 of Article 9), it would have solved
the problem of priority, and left competing secured parties with little to complain about. There is also precedent for
treating all leases under Article 9, with special remedies provisions analogous to those applicable to the sale of accounts.
See Coogan, Some Unconventional Security Devices, supra note 3, at 4A.06[4] (discussion of the law of Saskatchwan,
which adopts this position). For a discussion of the application of Article 9 to leases, see Coogan & Boss, U.C.C.
Treatment for All Leases, supra note 3.
81. See supra note 46. Cf. U.C.C. § 9-203. The debtor's "rights in the collateral" might give the lessee's creditors
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transaction must perfect in order to have priority in the leased goods over other
creditors of the lessee, 82 and must comply with all of the other provisions of Article
9, including those governing default.8 3
The question whether a lease is in fact a disguised security interest is not raised
directly in Article 9. It is cleverly hidden in the definition of security interest in
Section 1-201(37). The 1978 version of that definition provides:
"Security interest" means an interest in personal property or fixtures which secures payment
or performance of an obligation .... Unless a lease or consignment is intended as security,
reservation of title thereunder is not a "security interest" ..... Whether a lease is intended
as security is to be determined by the facts of each case; however, (a) the inclusion of an
option to purchase does not of itself make the lease one intended for security, and (b) an
agreement that upon compliance with the terms of the lease the lessee shall become or has
the option to become the owner of the property for no additional consideration or for a
nominal consideration does make the lease one intended for security. 4
As a result of this provision, and the cases interpreting it, a body of common law has
developed that attempts to pinpoint the critical factors which distinguish a true lease
from a disguised lease governed by Article 9. The courts have failed to focus upon
the true nature of a lease, however, and have contented themselves with devising a
laundry list of prohibited provisions, the presence of a sufficient number of which
will result in a determination that the lease is a security interest.
It is helpful to look at pre-Code law in interpreting this section. According to
pre-Code law, if the lessee paid an amount under the lease that was equal to the fair
market value of the goods at the time the lease began, and the lease provided the
option or requirement that the lessee purchase the goods, then the lease was
considered a conditional sale, and not a true lease. 85 This analysis missed the true
nature of a lease, since a true lease may contain an option to purchase the goods, so
long as the option price accurately reflects the lessor's residual value in the goods.
The current Code provision approves of options in true leases, focusing instead on the
option price.86
rights to the leasehold interest as a general intangible (see § 9-106), but not to the residual value of the goods, which in
a true lease is retained by the lessor and not the lessee. Note also that most security interests in leases are not given by
the lessee, but by the lessor to lessor's creditors, who take a security interest in the lease payments as accounts under
§ 9-106 (the right to payment for goods leased is an "account") or as chattel paper under § 9-105(1)(d) (A writing that
evidences both a monetary obligation and a security interest in or a lease of specific goods is chattel paper.). For an
excellent discussion of the problems associated with lease chattel paper, see Boss, supra note 31.
82. U.C.C. § 1-201(37). See infra notes 131-48 and accompanying text, which explains that a disguised lease is
in fact a security interest under Article 9, and U.C.C. § 9-301, which makes clear that an unperfected security interest
(including the interest of a lessor in a disguised lease) is subject to the interests of perfected secured creditors in the same
collateral, lien creditors, and bulk transferees and other nonordinary course buyers. In other words, an unperfected
security interest will take priority in the goods only after perfected security interests in the same goods have been satisfied.
83. U.C.C. § 9-501. The obligation to account to the debtor for proceeds after disposition of the collateral under
§ 9-504(2), and the debtor's right to demand disposition of the collateral under § 9-505 contrast with the right of a true
lessor to retain ownership of the property and still sue for default under the lease. See supra text accompanying notes
37-46.
84. U.C.C. § 1-201(37).
85. See UNTi. CosmoNs Sums Act § 1(2) (promulgated 1922); see generally WISisToN oN SAms (2d ed.) vol. 1,
§ 336 (1924); G. Gtuos, supra note 14, at § 3.6.
86. If option price in relation to anticipated residual value were always the test, and if courts had not departed from
this analysis when leases did not provide a purchase option, the 1978 Code standard would come much closer to focusing
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1. Leases with Options to Purchase
The Code definition of security interest provides the first set of factors for
determining whether or not a lease is a disguised security interest. First, it provides
that the existence of an option to purchase does not alone create a security interest.
Second, an option to purchase for no consideration or nominal additional consider-
ation creates a security interest.8 7
Does this mean that every lease that contains an option to purchase for nominal
consideration is a security interest, regardless of the other terms of the lease that may
make clear that the transaction is a true lease? The language of the section suggests
that a nominal consideration option is sufficient to create a security interest as a
matter of law. However, it is important to recall the introductory phrase of that
sentence, which explains that each case must be decided upon its own facts. The
comment to this section seems to bolster the conclusion that the existence of such an
option is not alone sufficient to create a disguised security interest: "The last two
sentences give guidance on the question whether reservation of title under a particular
lease is or is not a security interest." 88 The stronger argument is that even a nominal
consideration option is not sufficient to transform a transaction that is otherwise a true
lease into a security interest. For example, a lease that contains a nominal price
purchase option, but which may be terminated at any time by the lessee, should not
be considered a security interest. 89
While the definition in the Code better approximates the true nature analysis than
the one existing under common law, if applied mechanically to every lease without
further analysis, it still misses the mark. But if we take seriously the Code's
preliminary caution that all cases should be decided on their facts, then even cases
when the option price is a small dollar amount could be saved from a finding that they
are disguised security interests if the option payment reflects the residual value. 90
Most courts have ignored this warning, however, and held that a disguised security
interest exists whenever the option price is deemed nominal. 91 In fact, one case held
upon the true nature of a lease. Since an option price that reflects anticipated residual value (see supra notes 31 and 58)
of the goods at the time the option is exercised recognizes the lessor as the owner of the residual value, and compensates
her for that value, it focuses attention where it belongs-on the holder of the residual economic value at the completion
of the lease. But a test which focuses upon the option price in relation to the purchase price misses this critical point. Also,
factors like insurance obligation and risk of loss, which focus upon indicia of ownership other than residual value, miss
this point entirely.
87. See supra text accompanying notes 48-52.
88. U.C.C. § 1-201, Official Comment 37.
89. See Coogan, Some Unconventional Security Devices, supra note 3, at § 4A.01[2][c][vi][A]; cf. Granite Equip.
Leasing Corp. v. Acme Pump Co., 165 Conn. 364, 335 A.2d 294 (1973).
90. See supra text accompanying notes 61-62. Compare B. Cr.srK, THE LAw OF SEcURD TRAsACoNs UNDER Ta
UNFOR.M CO.,tERCIAL CODE 11.513], at 1-26 (1980), where the author states:
Even if the equipment has little useful life at the end of the lease term, it may not be necessary to file a financing
statement to protect the lessor's interest if the option price always bears a resemblance to the fair market value
of the property. However, an option price equalling or exceeding the fair market value of the property may be
considered nominal if the fair market value is itself nominal.
Id. (citations omitted). This raises the issue of a lease that creates a security interest, not because the option price fails
to reflect the anticipated value of the residual, but because the amount of the anticipated residual shows that the lease is
one to the end of useful life. See supra text accompanying notes 211-14.
91. See, e.g., In re J.A. Thompson & Son, Inc., 665 F.2d 941 (9th Cir. 1981); Percival Const. Co. v. Miller &
Miller Auctioneers, Inc., 532 F.2d 166 (10th Cir. 1976); In re Johnson, 1 Bankr. 689 (Bankr. D. Del. 1979); In re
1988]
OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 49:195
that the two clauses in the last sentence of Section 1-201(37) should be read in reverse
order, so that every lease containing a nominal option price is a security interest as
a matter of law. 92
Taking literally the prohibition on nominal price options, the courts have
developed three tests93 to determine whether the option price is nominal: the
economic compulsion test94 (completion of the purchase is the only reasonable
alternative for the lessee); the relationship between the option price and the original
purchase price;95 and the relationship between the option price and the value of the
goods at the time the option is exercised. 96
Each of these tests appears to distinguish between transactions in which the
lessee has bought both the use value and the residual value of the goods, and those
in which the residual still "belongs" to the lessor. Only the last of these three tests
focuses properly on the true nature of a lease, consistently reaching the same result
as the true nature analysis. Yet many courts have been willing to find a disguised
security interest without any inquiry at all into the essential economic issue: to whom
does the transaction allocate the residual value in the goods when the transaction is
complete?
By analyzing the first test, the economic compulsion test, one can see how a
court using this standard could miss the true nature of the transaction. Suppose a lease
provided an option to purchase the goods at the end of the lease term for $5000, and
it is anticipated that the goods will be worth $10,000. Under the economic
Vaillancourt, 7 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 748 (Bankr. D. Me. 1970) (decided by referee); In re Washington
Processing Co., 3 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 475 (S.D. Cal. 1966) (decided by referee); In re Royer's Bakery, Inc.,
1 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 342 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1963) (decided by referee). But see In re Reserves Dev. Corp.,
36 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 1327 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 1983); In re Cedar Valley Bandag, Inc., 29 U.C.C. Rep.
Serv. (Callaghan) 984 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 1980); In re Gehrke Enter., I Bankr. 647 (Bankr. W.D. Wis. 1979); In re
Samoset Assoc., 24 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 510 (Bankr. D. Me. 1978); Computer Sciences Corp. v. Sci-Tek,
Inc., 367 A.2d 658 (Del. Super. Ct. 1976); Arnold Mach. Co. v. Balls, 624 P.2d 678 (Utah 1981); The issue in these
cases is whether a nominal price option creates a security interest as a matter of law, regardless of the other factors (such
as a terminable obligation under the lease) which might be considered by a court in making this determination. The first
group of cases holds that a nominal price option is determinative. The second group looks to other factors, including
the right to terminate the lease without further payment, finding that such factors may create a true lease even in the
presence of a nominal price option. See generally Coogan, Some Unconventional Security Devices, supra note 3, at
§ 4A.01t2][c][vi].
92. See Peco, Inc. v. Hartbauer Tool & Die Co., 262 Or. 573, 500 P.2d 708 (1972); but see In re Marhoefer
Packing Co., 674 F.2d 1139 (7th Cir. 1982) (there was no security interest even when a nominal-price option existed,
because the lessee could terminate the lease at any time). See also supra text accompanying notes 48-52 and 61-62.
93. See In re International Plastics, Inc., 18 Bankr. 583 (Bankr. D. Kan. 1982); In re Tucker, 34 Bankr. 257
(Bankr. W.D. Okla. 1983); Peco, Inc. v. Hartbauer Tool & Die Co., 262 Or. 573, 500 P.2d 708 (1972). See infra note
104 for a fourth test that looks to the relationship between the option price and the lease payments.
94. See In re Vaillancourt, 7 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 748,762 (D. Me. 1970); In re Washington Processing
Co., 3 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 475, 478 (S.D. Cal. 1966).
95. In re Oak Mfg., 6 U.C.C. Rep Serv. (Callaghan) 1273 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1969) (decided by referee); In re
Herold Radio & Elec. Corp., 218 F.Supp. 284 (S.D.N.Y. 1963), aff'd 327 F.2d 564 (2d Cir. 1964).
96. See In re Marhoefer Packing Co., 674 F.2d 1139 (7th Cir. 1982); In re Anton's Lounge & Restaurant, Inc.,
40 Bankr. 134 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 1984); In re Clemmons, 37 Bankr. 712 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 1983); In re Loop Hosp.
Partnership, 35 Bankr. 929 (Bankr. N.D. Il1. 1983); In re Reserves Dev. Corp., 36 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 1327
(Bankr. W.D. Mo. 1983); In re International Plastics, Inc., 18 Bankr. 583 (Bankr. D. Kan. 1982); In re Boling, 13 Bankr.
39 (Bankr. E.D. Tenn. 1981); In re Butcher Boy Meat Mkt., Inc., 29 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 649 (Bankr. E.D.
Pa. 1980); In re Samoset Assoc., 24 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 510 (Bankr. D. Me. 1978); NBC Leasing Co. v.
Stilwell, 334 N.W.2d 496 (S.D. 1983); All-States Leasing Co. v. Ochs, 42 Or. App. 319, 600 P.2d 899 (Or. Ct. App.
1979).
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compulsion test, this is a disguised security interest, because the lessee would be a
fool not to buy goods worth $10,000 for $5000.97 This is also a disguised security
interest under the true nature analysis, because the lessor must not be the owner of the
residual economic value of the goods if he is obligated to sell the goods for
substantially less than their anticipated value. Obviously, the ownership of this
residual interest has already passed to the lessee in this transaction, and it is a security
interest. 98
As applied by the courts, however, the economic compulsion test has not always
reached a correct result for true nature purposes. Suppose the goods have an
anticipated market value of $5000 at the end of the lease term (the same as the option
price), but the lessee is under an economic compulsion to exercise the option because
the actual value of the residual has risen dramatically, or because replacement goods
are not readily available, or the disruption in use would be costly to the lessee. Or
suppose, for example, that the leased equipment is a neon sign with the name of
lessee's business, worth only $5000 to the lessor at the end of the lease term, but
replacement of the sign could be obtained only by expending $10,000. In this case,
the lessee would willingly exercise the option even if the option price were more than
the residual value of the goods, and yet the economic compulsion test would find that
this lease is a disguised security interest even though the lessor is being completely
compensated for the ownership of the residual value. In this example, a true nature
analysis would find a true lease, because the option price recognizes the lessor's
ownership of this residual economic value, and fully compensates the lessor for it.
Again, the question is not whether the lessee has made a good deal and will decide
to exercise the option, but whether the lessor has, as an economic matter, already sold
the residual to the lessee. Of course, as the lessee evaluates the costs if the option is
not exercised, he is indeed under an economic compulsion to exercise the option.
However, so long as the lessor receives full value for the ownership interest of the
residual value, this should not be considered a security interest, but a true lease.
The point is that the economic compulsion test only reaches the correct result
when it is applied to the economic choice which would be made by a reasonable
97. The courts applying this test have used the "no lessee in his right mind" standard: if exercise of the option is
too good of a deal for the lessee to pass up, it must be a disguised security agreement and not a lease. See, e.g., In re
Washington Processing Co., 3 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 475 (Bankr. S.D. Cal. 1966) ($1350 option to acquire
goods then worth $7500 created a security interest).
98. Rising or falling market value contrary to the expectations of the parties raises an interesting problem with the
economic compulsion test. Suppose that the lessor has agreed to an option price of $500, which both parties anticipate
will reflect the market value of the goods at the end of the transaction. However, when the time to exercise the option
arrives, the goods are actually worth $1000. In this example, the lessee is under an economic compulsion to exercise the
option. But it does not change the transaction from a true lease into a disguised security interest. The lessor has really
entered into two transactions: the lease of the goods, and an option contract for the sale of the residual value. By setting
an option price, the lessor as potential seller retains the risk that the option price will not fully compensate her for the full
residual value at the end of the lease term. Unless the option is exercised, the lessor still owns the residual value. And
unless the exercise of the option is mandatory, this remains a lease. This is no different from the situation when the lease
value of the goods rises during the lease term. The lessor has contracted away the absolute right to take advantage of the
rising value, and yet this fact alone does not turn the lease into a disguised security interest. The same is true of falling
market value. The lessor who grants a purchase option may be hopeful of receiving the option price as compensation for
her residual value, but if there is no absolute right to enforce this option, there is still a true lease. See supra notes 31,
58, and text accompanying notes 63-66. For an analysis of these problems in the definition of a lease, see Ayer, On the
Vacuity, supra note 3, at 671-81.
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lessee. For example, if the lessee can satisfy his obligation under the lease by exercise
of the option, for a price less than completion of the lease obligation, this creates an
economic compulsion that is entirely consistent with the true nature of a security
interest.99 Every reasonable lessee will exercise this option, and the transaction is a
security interest.
When the economic compulsion test is applied to the relationship between the
option price and the value of the goods in the hands of a specific lessee, the result may
be inconsistent with a true nature determination. There is, of course, the argument
that the value of the goods to the lessee is the only relevant value, and that the market
value does not fully reflect the residual value to the lessee. 100 This argument misses
the point that exercise of the option requires the lessor to transfer the residual value
of the goods for the option payment. If the option payment represents what the lessor
would obtain on the market, then the transaction is a true lease. If third parties are
willing to pay only $500, then the goods have a residual value of $500. If the lessee
is willing to pay more than this, then the payment must be for something other than
the residual value of the goods: in this example, that "something else" is a premium
that represents the value of the goods in place, or the value of the time associated with
disruption. The lessor surely has not previously been compensated for these values by
the lease payments, and yet the lessee is under a very real economic compulsion to
exercise the option. A lessee who anticipates the cost of this removal or disruption
may choose a lease with an option to buy, or a purchase of the goods under a security
agreement. But the mere existence of an economic incentive for the lessee to exercise
the option in a specific circumstance, whether anticipated by the parties at the outset
or not, seems entirely too subjective to turn an otherwise valid true lease into a
security interest.101
The second test, that looks to the relationship between the option price and the
original purchase price, may also lead to incorrect results. The cases applying this
method have used a simple mathematical cutoff, finding that an option price that is
less than 10%,102 or less than 25%103 of the original purchase price is nominal. But
without inquiry into the anticipated value of the goods at the time the option is
99. See supra text accompanying notes 55-57.
100. See, e.g., In re Keydata Corp., 18 Bankr. 907 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1982) (equipment unique to lessee's purpose
and fair market value to third party would be substantially below purchase price; option is nominal in relation to fair
market value to lessee).
101. The same argument applies to the loss of upside risk when the lessor grants an option to buy for a specific price.
The relevant inquiry is whether the lessor is receiving what he anticipates the residual will be worth when he grants the
option. Although the value of that residual may have risen by the time the option is exercised, the transaction should not
be transubstantiated into a security interest. See supra notes 63-66 and accompanying text. The same is true of the value
of the goods to the specific lessee. Just because the goods unexpectedly become particularly valuable to the lessee, thus
creating an economic incentive to exercise the option, does not mean that the transaction was not, and does not remain,
a true lease.
102. See, e.g., In re Herold Radio & Elec. Corp., 218 F. Supp. 284 (S.D.N.Y. 1963), aff'd 327 F.2d 564 (2d Cir.
1964); In re Midwest Airmoving Corp., 184 F. Supp. 474 (N.D. Ohio 1959) (conditional sale), aff'd 277 F.2d 792 (6th
Cir. 1960); In re Creditors of Merkel, Inc., 45 Misc. 2d 753, 258 N.Y.S.2d 118 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1965) (conditional sale),
rev'd sub nom. In re Merkel, Inc., 25 A.D.2d 764, 269 N.Y.S.2d 190 (1966).
103. See, e.g., In re Wheatland Elec. Prod. Co., 237 F. Supp. 820 (W.D. Pa. 1964); Percival Costr. Co. v. Miller
& Miller Auctioneers, Inc., 532 F.2d 166 (10th Cir. 1976).
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exercised, this test is irrelevant to the true nature of the lease. 1' 4 For example,
suppose computer equipment could be purchased in 1980 for $100,000, and a lessee
enters into a lease with an option to buy the equipment in 1986 for $5000. Because
computer equipment depreciates rapidly due to galloping obsolescence, the relation-
ship between the option price and the purchase price is really irrelevant. The only
relevant question is whether the lessor is being compensated for the anticipated
residual value of the goods.' 0 5
The only test that focuses on the true nature of the transaction is the third test,
which looks to the relationship between the option price and the residual value of the
goods when the option is exercised. In applying this test, the courts have indeed
focused upon the allocation of economic value between the lessor and lessee. If the
court finds that the option price permits the lessee to obtain the residual for an amount
which is less than the residual value, then this is a disguised security interest. As
noted above, 16 this test should focus on the residual as anticipated by the parties at
the time the lease transaction is entered which grants the option and sets the option
price.' 07 Any other timing permits the transubstantiation of a lease into a security
interest, or the reverse, resulting from an unanticipated change in the market value of
the residual during the lease term.
The courts applying this test have not often been confronted with a change in
market value.' 08 The determination is usually based upon evidence of market value
at the time the option was exercised. Assuming that there is no proof of a change in
the value of the residual as anticipated when the option price is set, and the time the
option is exercised, this test reaches the correct result. But when there has been a
change in value, the test should be applied according to the realistic anticipation of
the parties when the option price is set. One opinion has addressed this problem in
dictum. The case involved an option to renew, not a purchase option, but the dissent
noted the importance of a change in value during the lease term.
This first test which turns on the fair market value of the item at the time of the outright
purchase by the lessee is the simplest for courts to apply. It merely involves comparison of
two factors which are easily quantified.... However, as it is applied by most courts, it is
essentially a retrospective determination. Thus, it does not give much guidance to parties
wishing to enter into a true lease in a situation where the resale market for the leased items
is either unknown or apt to fluctuate widely. The parties themselves would not be able to
104. Some courts have looked to the relationship between the lease payments and the option price, possibly
presuming that the lease payments reflect some measure of the market value of the goods. See, e.g., In re Medical Oxygen
Serv., 36 Bankr. 341 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 1984); In re B. A. Giancaterin & Assoc., 9 Bankr. 26 (Bankr. W.D.N.Y. 1981).
These cases suffer from the same difficulty as those cited in the text which look to the relationship between the original
purchase price and the option price.
105. See supra note 58 and text accompanying notes 63-66.
106. See supra text accompanying notes 54-62 on the correct evaluation of the option price.
107. See supra text accompanying notes 63-66.
108. See supra notes 58 and 96. See also In re Pacific Sunwest Printing, 6 Bankr. 408 (Bankr. S.D. Cal. 1980); In
re Universal Medical Servs., Inc., 8 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 614 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1970) (decided by referee);
In re Alpha Creamery, 4 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 794 (Bankr. W.D. Mich. 1967) (decided by referee); In re
Washington Processing Co., 3 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 475 (Bankr. S.D. Cal. 1966) (decided by referee); Western
Enter. v. Arctic Office Machs., Inc., 667 P.2d 1232 (Alaska 1983); Granite Equip. Leasing Corp. v. Acme Pump Co.,
165 Conn. 364, 335 A.2d 294 (1973); Peco, Inc. v. Hartbauer Tool & Die Co., 262 Or. 573, 500 P.2d 708 (1972); Davis
Bros. v. Misco Leasing, Inc., 508 S.W.2d 908 (Tex. Civ. App. 1974).
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determine the nature of their relationship. Rather, whether they had indeed leased the items
would turn on the market price of the goods at the end of the term or a court's estimate of
that figure in the event of interim default. This difficulty may best be resolved by comparing
the option price to the estimated resale value of the property as of the time the transaction
was entered into instead of comparing it to the actual market value when the option is
exercised. 1o9
The court, recognizing the important guidance provided by a test that can be applied
prospectively, correctly noted that the true nature of the transaction must be
determined as of the time the option price is set in the lease agreement. The few
courts that have addressed a difference between anticipated and actual residual value
have generally reached a consistent result. 10
In Appleway Leasing, Inc. v. Wilken, 1 the court dealt with a disparity between
the anticipated and actual fair market value of the leased goods. The lease contained
an option specifying that the anticipated fair market value of the goods was $1900.
The court considered the option nominal when the evidence showed that the actual
fair market value was between $9000 and $10,000. There was no evidence that this
disparity was the result of an unanticipated change in market value; the court correctly
discerned that the anticipated residual value set by the parties was an attempt to evade
a finding that the lease was a security interest. The court was not fooled by this
provision, and correctly found that the lease was one intended for security.1 2
Another case that dealt with this issue is In re Celeryvale Transportation, Inc. 113
In Celeryvale, the option required payment of the fair market value of the equipment
at the end of the lease, as established by independent appraisers. Although it does not
seem under the true nature analysis that this factor alone could create a security
interest, the court went to great lengths to take evidence on the fair market value of
the equipment. An appraiser testified on the resale value of comparable equipment,
as well as the increase in the cost of new equipment during the lease term, which
resulted in a concomitant rise in the price of used equipment. Based upon this
109. McGalliard v. Liberty Leasing Co. of Alaska, 534 P.2d 528, 538 (Alaska 1975) (Boocherer, J., dissenting)
(emphasis in original) overruled Western Enters., Inc. v. Arctic Office Machs., Inc., 667 P.2d 1232 (Alaska 1983). See
the treatment of this timing under the Proposed Amendment to § 1-201(37), infra at notes 149-230 and accompanying
text.
110. See, e.g., In re Samoset Assoc., 24 U.C.C. Rep. Sew. (Callaghan) 510 (D. Me. 1978) (option that permitted
purchase for greater of fair market value at the time of exercise or 10% of original acquisition cost could not be deemed
nominal in the absence of evidence as to the actual fair market value); In re Universal Medical Servs., Inc., 325 F.Supp.
891 (E.D. Pa. 1970) (option price of 10% of original selling price closely approximated the market value of the goods
at the end of the lease term, and was therefore not nominal); In re Boling, 13 Bankr. 39 (Bankr. E.D. Tenn. 1981) (option
to purchase for estimated fair market value at end of lease term, which was specified in lease as 10% of original selling
price, was roughly equivalent to the actual fair market value, and was not nominal); Horton v. Dental Capital Leasing
Corp., 649 S.W.2d 655 (Tex. Ct. App. 1983) (option that specified the purchase price to be the fair market value at the
time of exercise was not nominal). A similar option was at issue in In re Holywell Corp., 51 Bankr. 56 (Bankr. S.D. Fla.
1985). In that case, the option was to be the greater of the unrecovered original cost of the leased goods or the market
value at the time the option was exercised. The evidence showed that the market value was 99% of the purchase price,
or $7.7 million. The court correctly determined that these were true leases.
111. 39 Or. App. 43, 591 P.2d 382 (1979).
112. Id. at 46-47, 591 P.2d at 383-84.
113. 44 Bankr. 1007 (Bankr. E.D. Tenn. 1984), aff'd, 822 F.2d 16 (6th Cir. 1987).
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evidence, the court held that the option price was not nominal, and the transactions
were true leases. 114
2. Leases Without Purchase Options
As far as the courts have strayed from the true nature analysis when an option
price exists, they are even further from the mark when there is no option at all. Under
Section 1-201(37), it is possible even in the absence of a purchase option to find that
a lease is a disguised security interest. The only remaining guidance in Section
1-201(37) are the statements that:
(1) unless the lease is intended to create a security interest, the reservation of title
is not a "security interest";
(2) whether a lease is intended as security is to be determined by the facts of each
case; and
(3) an option alone does not create a security interest.115
But what other factors will create a security interest? Article 9 defines a security
interest broadly, looking to the intent of the transaction, regardless of the terms used
by the parties to describe it.116
The scope provision of Article 9 explains: "[T]his Article applies (a) to any
transaction (regardless of its form) which is intended to create a security interest in
personal property or fixtures including goods. ... 1"7 Subsection 2 states that the
Article will apply to a security interest created by a lease transaction.1 8 Comment 1
to this section refers to the definition of security interest in Section 1-201(37), and
states: "The conditional sale or bailment-lease, for example, is not prohibited; but
even though it is used, the rules of this Article govern.""19
114. Id. at 1015. The opinion of the court raises the very difficult problem of the interaction between an option price
which is nominal but not a disguised security interest because the actual residual value is nominal, and a lease to the end
of useful life. In theory, a lease with an option to purchase for $10 at the end of the lease term, when goods are worth
$10 at the end of the term, should not create a security interest because of a nominal option price. But it may create a
disguised security interest because the lease is in fact a lease to the end of useful life. See discussion supra notes 67-72
and accompanying text. In Celeryvale, the court said:
An option to purchase at the end of the lease for the fair market value of the leased goods is consistent with
a true lease, but does not automatically save the lease from being a lease intended for security. In re Coors of
the Cumberland, Inc., 19 Bankr 313, 33 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 241 (Bankr. M.D. Tenn. 1982); In re
Winston Mills, Inc., [6 Bankr. 587, 598 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1980)] ....
The proof may show that the goods will have no market value at the end of the lease and will be abandoned
or transferred to the lessee for no additional payment or for a miniscule payment that is clearly nominal
consideration. This is likely to be true for goods that are near the end of their useful life and have little or no
salvage value. In such a situation the option to purchase for fair market value is a sham that does not prevent
the lease from being a lease intended for security.
Id. at 1013-14. See also In re Berge, 32 Bankr. 370 (Bankr. W.D. Wis. 1983); Atlas Indus., Inc. v. National Cash
Register Co., 216 Kan. 213, 531 P.2d 41 (1975). For treatment of this problem under the Proposed Amendment, see infra
text accompanying notes 149-230.
115. U.C.C. § 1-201(37).
116. See Leasing Serv. Corp. v. American Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 19 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 252, 258
(D.N.J. 1976). See also supra text accompanying notes 14-18, discussing "intent" which notes that characterization of
the transaction is unaffected by what label the parties give to it.
117. U.C.C. § 9-102(1).
118. U.C.C. § 9-102(2).
119. U.C.C. § 9-102, Official Comment 1.
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How then have the courts distinguished between a lease and a disguised security
interest when the option price is not nominal, or there is no option at all? Rather than
focusing upon any of the economic distinctions between these two transactions, the
courts have developed a laundry list of factors they rely upon to find that a lease is
subject to Article 9. There is no one litmus test; the courts tend merely to look at the
lease agreement, total up the number of offending terms, and call the lease a security
interest.
Factors considered by the courts to create a disguised security interest include:
(1) whether the total rental exceeds the fair market value of the property at the time
the lease is entered into,120
(2) whether the lessee has an obligation to insure the equipment against loss,1 21
(3) whether the lessee has an obligation to pay the full lease amount regardless of loss
of the property, or loss of its use,I 22
(4) whether the lessee is unable to terminate his obligations under the lease by return
of the property, 123
(5) whether the lessee has an obligation to indemnify the lessor from liability arising
in connection with the goods,124
(6) whether the lessee has an obligation to pay taxes on the property, 25
(7) whether future rent is accelerated in the event of default,1 26
(8) whether the value of the property to the lessee in place vastly exceeds its value
upon removal to the lessor, 2 7
(9) whether there is an exclusion of all warranties on the property, 28 and
(10) whether the lessor is the original owner, manufacturer, or supplier of the property
that is the subject of the lease. 129
Each of these factors is a traditional indicium of ownership, tending to make the
lease more like a security interest and less like a true lease. But the courts have been
unwilling to define this distinction in a more analytical way by focusing upon the
relative economic interests of the lessor and the lessee in the property. If the lessee
has primary economic interest in the leased property, rather than an interest only in
its use, while the lessor has primary economic interest in the lease obligation, rather
120. See Leasing Serv. Corp. v. American Nat'l Bank &Trust Co., 19 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 252 (D.N.J.
1976); In re Francis, 42 Bankr. 763 (Bankr. E.D. Mo. 1984).
121. See, e.g., Leasing Serv. Corp. v. American Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 19 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 252
(D.N.J. 1976); In re Brookside Drug Store, Inc., 3 Bankr. 120 (Bankr. D. Conn. 1980).
122. See, e.g., In re Clemmons, 37 Bankr. 712 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 1984); In re Brookside Drug Store, Inc., 3
Bankr. 120 (Bankr. D. Conn. 1980).
123. See In re Smith Management, Inc., 8 Bankr. 346 (Bankr. W.D. Wis. 1980).
124. See, e.g., Leasing Serv. Corp. v. American Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 19 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 252
(D.N.J. 1976).
125. See, e.g., In re Tillery, 571 F.2d 1361 (5th Cir. 1978).
126. See, e.g., In re Pomona Valley Inn, 4 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 893 (C.D. Cal. 1967); Leasing Serv.
Corp. v. American Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 19 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 252 (D.N.J. 1976).
127. See, e.g., McGalliard v. Liberty Leasing Co. of Alaska, 534 P.2d 528 (Alaska 1975), overruled by Western
Enters., Inc. v. Arctic Office Machs., Inc., 667 P.2d 1232 (Alaska 1983).
128. See, e.g., Lease Fin., Inc. v. Burger, 40 Colo. App. 107, 575 P.2d 857 0977).
129. See, e.g., Woods-Tucker Leasing Corp. v. Hutcheson-Ingram Dev. Co., 626 F.2d 401 (5th Cir. 1980), opinion
withdrawn by 642 F.2d 744 (5th Cir. 1981); Executive Fin. Servs. v. Pagel, 238 Kan. 809, 715 P.2d 381 (1986). See
generally In re Brookside Drug Store, Inc., 3 Bankr. 120 (Bankr. D. Conn. 1980) (listing sixteen factors considered in
determining whether a transaction is a true lease or a security interest).
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than payment for use coupled with residual value, then the lease is a disguised
security interest.
For example, parties may agree in the lease that the lessee will be obligated to
insure or pay taxes on the leased goods. This is an allocation of responsibility that
does not affect the lessor's position as the holder of the residual economic value.
Under a true nature analysis, such factors have no bearing on whether the lease is a
disguised security interest. The same is true of the value of the goods in place. If the
lessor is concerned that the goods are more valuable to the lessee than to the lessor,
then there are several things that the lessor can do. The lessor can charge a higher
rent, or place a higher cost on the exercise of the option. Neither of these choices
results in a security interest-so long as the lessor obtains the anticipated value for the
exercise of the option, the transaction remains a true lease. As an alternative, the
parties can structure the transaction which transfers this residual value to the lessee-
that is, the parties can enter into a sale transaction with a retention of a security
interest. But the value of the goods in place does not alone determine the ownership
of the residual value. 130
3. The Effect of Calling a Lease a Disguised Security Interest
The importance of subjecting a lease to the provisions of Article 9 takes two
forms: the necessity of filing to perfect a security interest in the leased goods and the
obligation of the lessor to comply with Part 5 of Article 9 upon repossession of the
leased property. In addition, a finding that a lease is in fact a sale may subject the
agreement to attack under state usury laws. 13'
The first issue should no longer present major difficulties for lessors. Every
lessor, even one who would protest that the lease is not a disguised security
agreement, should file a financing statement. This is cheap insurance to protect the
leased goods, and will not affect the characterization of the transaction as outside of
Article 9.132 Section 9-408 contemplates just such a filing:
A ... lessor of goods may file a financing statement using the terms . . . "lessor,"
"lessee" or the like instead of the terms specified in Section 9-402. The provisions of [Part
4 of Article 9] shall apply as appropriate to such financing statement but its filing shall not
of itself be a factor in determining whether or not the ... lease is intended as security
(Section 1-201(37)). However, if it is determined for other reasons that the. . lease is so
intended, a security interest of the.., lessor which attaches to the ... leased goods is
perfected by such filing.133
Comment 2 to that section provides:
130. See supra text following note 98 for an example of a true lease when the goods in place have a greater value
than the market value. This factor does not change the fact that the lessor still owns the market value of the goods at the
end of the lease, absent an option to purchase for less than their residual value on the market. This test is inappropriate
for the same reasons as the "economic compulsion" test which has been applied to purchase options. See supra text
accompanying notes 97-101.
131. See Bell v. Itek Leasing Corp., 262 Ark. 22, 555 S.W.2d 1 (1977).
132. But see infra note 135 discussing the risk of filing in those states that have not enacted this amendment.
133. U.C.C. § 9-408.
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If a lease is actually intended as security . . . . this Article applies in full. But this question
of intention is a doubtful one, and the lessor may choose to file for safety even while
contending that the lease is a true lease for which no filing is required. This section
authorizes filing with appropriate changes of terminology, and without affecting the
substantive question of classification of the lease. If the lease is a true lease, none of the
provisions of the Article is applicable to the lease as an interest in the chattel. 13
Thus, any argument over the lessor's priority in the leased goods can be resolved by
filing a financing statement, and the filing of such a statement cannot be considered
by the court in determining whether a lease is a security interest. 35 Of course, the
existence of a filing under Section 9-408 does not protect the lessor from a finding
that the lease is a security interest, when other factors support the conclusion.136 If a
court finds that a lease is a security interest, the lessor's failure to have filed a
financing statement will defeat the lessor's priority in the property. 37
Even filing a financing statement under Section 9-408 offers only limited
protection for a lessor. While a precautionary filing will maintain the lessor's priority
in the event that the court finds that the transaction creates a security interest, 38 it
does not excuse the lessor from complying with the other obligations of a secured
creditor. For example, if the court finds that the lease is a security interest, the lessor
is required to comply with the default provisions of Article 9.139 The lessee will retain
the right to redeem the property under Section 9-506,140 and the lessee will be freed
from any obligation to pay a deficiency if the lessor fails to comply with Section
9-504. 141
Obviously, these issues are important in bankruptcy. A secured party disguised
as a lessor who fails to file will be deemed an unsecured creditor as to the leased
goods under the strong-arm powers of the trustee. 142 And the trustee may pursue
rights under Section 9-507 when a lessor fails to comply with the default provisions
134. U.C.C. § 9-408, Official Comment 2.
135. See Rollins Communications, Inc. v. Georgia Inst. of Real Estate, Inc., 140 Ga. App. 448, 451, 231 S.E.2d
397, 399 (1976). Note, however, that this section is part of the 1972 amendments to Article 9, and has not been adopted
in many states. See, e.g., Mo. REv. STAT. §§ 400.9-408 (1986) (additional filing requirements). Without this amendment,
the filing of a financing statement is not without risk. Where this amendment has not been adopted, there is case authority
that the filing of a security interest may be considered as one factor in finding that a lease is a security interest. See Bell
v. Itek Leasing Corp., 262 Ark. 22, 25, 555 S.W.2d 1, 3 (1977); Computer Sciences Corp. v. Sci-Tek, Inc., 367 A.2d
658, 660-61 (Del. Super. 1976); BVA Credit Corp. v. Fisher, 369 So. 2d 606, 609 (Fla. App. 1978) cert. den. Fisher v.
BVA Credit Corp., 370 So. 2d 459 (Fla. 1979). Other courts addressing this issue have applied the reasoning of § 9-403
even in the absence of its adoption. See, e.g., American Standard Credit, Inc. v. National Cement Co., 643 F.2d 248 (5th
Cir. 1981).
136. See, e.g., In re Sprecher Bros. Livestock & Grain, Ltd., 58 Bankr. 408 (Bankr. D.S.D. 1986).
137. See In re Pacific Sunwest Printing, 6 Bankr. 408,415 (Bankr. S.D. Cal. 1980); In re Gehrke Enters., 1 Bankr.
647 (Bankr. W.D. Wis. 1979).
138. See In re Vintage Press, Inc., 552 F.2d 1145 (5th Cir. 1977); In re Butcher Boy Meat Mkt., Inc., 29 U.C.C.
Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 649 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1981).
139. See, e.g., Clune Equip. Leasing Corp. v. Spangler, 615 S.W.2d 106 (Mo. App. 1981); General Elec. Credit
Corp. v. Castiglione, 19 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 705 (N.J. Super. 1976).
140. See H.M.O. Sys., Inc. v. Choicecare Health Servs., 665 P.2d 635 (Colo. App. 1983); U C Leasing, Inc. v.
Laughlin, 96 Nev. 157, 606 P.2d 167 (1980).
141. See, e.g., U C Leasing, Inc. v. Laughlin, 96 Nev. 157, 606 P.2d 167 (1980).
142. See 11 U.S.C. § 544(a) (1982 & Supp. 111 1985).
[Vol. 49:195
1988] PERSONAL PROPERTY LEASES UNDER THE UCC 233
of Article 9.143 In addition, the trustee will have a longer period to decide whether to
retain the goods if the transaction is deemed a security agreement than if the court
finds it to be a true lease. 144 Finally, a true lease may give rise to an adequate
protection obligation that is greater than that obtainable by a secured creditor.145 And,
of course, this distinction will also be relevant if the lessor becomes a debtor in
bankruptcy, since the rights of a lessor are different from the rights of a secured party,
and this distinction will be reflected in the lessor/secured party's bankruptcy estate. 146
The issue whether a transaction is a security interest or a true lease has generated
litigation far in excess of its relative importance to Article 9.147 A consistent test that
looks to the relative economic interests of the parties would serve the purpose of
reflecting the true nature of a leasing transaction. But more importantly, it would also
permit the parties to this transaction to avoid needless litigation over an issue the
determining factors of which are resolved at the time the transaction takes place.148
At present, the answer to the question "what makes a lease a disguised security
interest?" is not discemable from the most careful reading of the cases that attempt,
feebly, to answer it.
B. The Proposed Amendment to Section 1-201(37)
As a result of the myriad problems in applying the current version of Section
1-201(37), the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws and
the American Law Institute have promulgated an amendment to Section 1-201(37) to
identify the factors important in distinguishing secured transactions arising in
financed sales from true leases. 149
1. An Overview of the Proposed Amendment
As a part of Article 2A, the drafters propose an amendment of Section 1-201(37)
to clarify when a lease is a disguised security agreement. The Proposed Amendment
provides some additional distinctions 50 between true leases which are not intended
143. U.C.C. § 9-507. See In re Chisholm, 54 Bankr. 52 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1985). Note that even a disguised lessor
who files a protective financing statement is not immune from the application of the provisions of Part 5 of Article 9.
144. See 11 U.S.C. § 365 (1982 & Supp. as 1985); In re Loop Hosp. Partnership, 35 Bankr. 929 (Bankr. N.D. I11.
1983).
145. For an excellent discussion of the different rights of a lessor and a secured party in bankruptcy, see L. LoPucia,
SmrTEaGn roR CsnrrRs iN BANKRuonurcv Poc:rEus §§ 7.2, 7.4, 12.7.1, 13, 16.3.2, and 17 (1985).
146. See In re OPM Leasing Servs., Inc., 23 Bankr. 104 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1982). See discussion of this case in
B. CLARK, THE L~w oFSEcuRED TRAsxcnoss UNDFxtm UuFoRm Co.soHaAL CoDE 9 S1.5[3], at § 1-19 (1980 & Supp. 1987).
147. The cases on this issue are digested in the U.C.C. Rep. Serv. Digest at 1201.37(7), 9102.17, and 9408. The
§ 1-201(37) annotation alone rmns 85 pages as of the date of this writing, and virtually every conceivable leasing provision
is represented there. Obviously, whatever the intent of the courts in resolving this issue, the attempted solution is not
working.
148. There is a superb discussion of this issue in B. CLaK, THE LAw oF SEcuRED TRAsAcnoNs UNDER mE UNIFORM
Co.%.snaz, CoDE 1.5, at 1-22 to 1-33 (1980). See also Coogan, Some Unconventional Security Devices, supra note 3.
149. See supra notes 19-21 for the promulgation process.
150. Under the current version of U.C.C. § 1-201(37), there are few explicit guidelines. First, whether a lease is
intended as security is to be decided by the facts of each case. Second, the existence of an option to purchase does not
alone create a security interest. Third, an option to purchase for no consideration or nominal additional consideration
makes the lease a security interest as a matter of law. Fourth, the reservation of title alone does not create a security
interest. See U.C.C. § 1-201(37), and text accompanying notes 78-148.
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as security interests, and those which are disguised security interests.' 5 ' These
distinctions focus upon the economic reality of the transaction. 152 In essence, the test
provided by this amendment is a true nature analysis: if the residual value of the
leased goods is passing to the lessee for no payment or nominal payment, the lease
is a disguised security interest, but if the lessor retains the residual value of the goods
absent payment by the lessee of an amount equal to the fair market value of the
residual interest, then the lease is not a security interest.
This is an appropriate focus for the distinction between these two types of
transactions, and it is consistent with other existing rules under the U.C.C. For
example, under Article 9, surplus value after the sale of repossessed security goes to
the debtor, who is the owner of the residual value notwithstanding the existence of a
security interest, while the lessor may retain any surplus value upon repossession of
true leased goods.153
The Proposed Amendment to Section 1-201(37) retains the proviso of the
original section that each case is to be determined on its own facts. It deletes,
however, any reference to the intention of the parties. 154 The Official Comment to the
Proposed Amendment states:
Reference to the intent of the parties to create a lease or security interest has led to
unfortunate results. In discovering intent, courts have relied upon factors that were thought
to be more consistent with sales or loans than leases. Most of these criteria, however, are as
applicable to true leases as to security interests. Examples include the typical net lease
provisions, a purported lessor's lack of storage facilities or its character as a financing party
rather than a dealer in goods. Accordingly, amended Section 1-201(37) deletes all reference
to the parties' intent. 55
The Proposed Amendment does not leave courts to their task with only the facts
of each case to guide them. The Amendment offers some specific guidelines. It
creates a two-step test for finding a disguised security interest. The test focuses first
upon the obligation of the lessee under the lease. If the consideration paid by the
lessee for the term of the lease is not subject to termination by the lessee (for example,
if the lessee continues to owe the obligation of payment under the lease even if the
goods are returned, or they become inoperative), then the transaction passes the first
hurdle for identification of a security interest.' 56 This provision is intended to
151. Proposed Amendment U.C.C. § 1-201(37), supra note 3.
152. See id. The Official Comment states, "All of these tests focus on economics, not the intent of the parties."
153. See U.C.C. § 9-504(2) and supra text accompanying notes 30-41.
154. See supra text accompanying notes 84-85 for the source of the intent language, and supra text accompanying
notes 14-18 for the difficulties this language has created.
155. Proposed Amendment, U.C.C. § 1-201(37), supra note 3, Official Comment.
156. The relevant portion of the Proposed Amendment provides:
Whether a transaction creates a lease or security interest is determined by the facts of each case; however, a
transaction creates a security interest if the consideration the lessee is to pay the lessor for the right to possession
and use of the goods is an obligation for the term of the lease not subject to termination by the lessee, and
(a) the original term of the lease is equal to or greater than the remaining economic life of the goods,
(b) the lessee is bound to renew the lease for the remaining economic life of the goods or is bound to become
the owner of the goods,
(c) the lessee has an option to renew the lease for the remaining economic life of the goods for no additional
consideration or nominal additional consideration upon compliance with the lease agreement, or
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undercut decisions that held that a lease which could be terminated at any time was
nonetheless a disguised security interest.157 The comment explains:
The second paragraph of the new definition is taken from Section 1(2) of the Uniform
Conditional Sales Act (act withdrawn 1943), modified to reflect current leasing practice.
Thus, reference to case law prior to this Act will provide a useful source of precedent....
Whether a transaction creates a lease or a security interest continues to be determined by
the facts of each case. The second paragraph further provides that a transaction creates a
security interest if the lessee has an obligation to continue paying consideration for the term
of the lease, if the obligation is not terminable by the lessee (thus correcting early statutory
gloss ... ) and if one of four additional tests is met. 158
After determining that the lessee's obligation is not tenninable, a second step
must be satisfied in order to find a security interest. Under this test, one of the
following factors must also be present:
(a) the original term of the lease is equal to or greater than the economic life of
the goods, 15 9
(b) the lessee is bound to renew the lease for the remaining economic life of the
goods, or is bound to become the owner of the goods,
(c) the lessee has the option to renew the lease for the economic life of the goods
for nominal or no additional consideration upon compliance with the lease agreement,
or
(d) the lessee has the option to become the owner of the goods for nominal or
no additional consideration upon compliance with the lease agreement. 160
Each of these elements presents a different example of the factors that will result
in the transaction being deemed a security interest from the inception of the
transaction. First, if the original lease is for the remaining economic life of the goods,
the transaction is a security interest. The Proposed Amendment does not sanction a
true lease to the end of economic life, unless the lessee is permitted under the lease
to terminate the transaction. "Economic life" is determined, according to the
Proposed Amendment, as of the time that the transaction is entered into. t6 1 As
discussed above, this is the appropriate point for making this determination, and
permits the parties to create a true lease transaction which will not be undone by
subsequent events beyond their control. 162
Second, if the lessee is obligated under the lease to renew for the remaining
economic life, then the transaction is similarly considered a security interest from its
(d) the lessee has an option to become the owner of the goods for no additional consideration or nominal
additional consideration upon compliance with the lease agreement.
Proposed Amendment, U.C.C. § 1-201(37), supra note 3.
157. See, e.g., In re Royer's Bakery, Inc., 1 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 342 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1963), and supra
note 49.
158. Proposed Amendment, U.C.C. § 1-201(37), supra note 3, Official Comment, (citations omitted) citing In re
Royer's Bakery, Inc., I U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 342 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1963).
159. Economic life of the goods is to be determined as of the time the transaction is entered into. See Proposed
Amendment, U.C.C. § 1-201(37)(y), supra note 3. See supra text accompanying notes 67-72 for a discussion of leases
to the end of economic life.
160. Proposed Amendment, U.C.C. § 1-201(37), supra note 3.
161. Proposed Amendment, U.C.C. § 1-201(37)(y), supra note 3.
162. See supra text accompanying notes 67-72.
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inception. 163 The same is true if the option is really no option at all, but requires the
lessee to acquire the property. 164 Both of these terms create a transaction in which the
nominal "lessee" is contractually bound to purchase the residual, which is properly
treated as a sale and security interest.
Third, if the lessee has the option to renew for the remaining economic life, and
the price for the renewal is nominal, then the initial transaction is not a true lease.1 65
"Nominal price" is defined to exclude a rent which is agreed in the lease to be the
fair market rent when the option is exercised.16 So, for example, if the lease grants
the lessee an option to renew for the remaining economic life but specifies that the
renewal price will be determined at the time of renewal, and will be the fair market
rent at that time, then the lease is not a disguised security agreement.167
Finally, if the lease contains an option to purchase the goods for no consideration
or nominal consideration, the lease is a security interest.' 68 Again, "nominal" is
defined in the Proposed Amendment to exclude a transaction in which the parties
stipulate that the option price will be fair market value, to be determined at the time
the option is performed.' 69
It is essential to remember that the two prong test provided by the Proposed
Amendment only answers the question whether the original lease transaction was
really a disguised security interest. It does not answer the question whether the
transaction ceased to be a true lease as a result of the exercise of an option. In other
words, the Proposed Amendment tells us whether the initial transaction is a security
interest. It does not, by its terms, directly address the problem of the chameleon
lease. 170
163. Proposed Amendment, U.C.C. § 1-201(37)(f'rst b), supra note 3. See id., Official Comment, citing In re
Gehrke Enters., 1 Bankr. 647 (Bankr. W.D. Wis. 1979).
164. Proposed Amendment, U.C.C. § 1-201(37)(first b), supra note 3. See supra text accompanying note 54.
165. Proposed Amendment, U.C.C. § 1-201(37)(first c), supra note 3. See supra text accompanying notes 67-72.
166. Proposed Amendment, U.C.C. § 1-201(37)(x)(i), supra note 3.
167. Id., Official Comment, citing In re Celeryvale, 44 Bankr. 1007 (Bankr. E.D. Tenn. 1984) discussed supra text
accompanying notes 113-14.
168. Proposed Amendment, U.C.C. § 1-201(37)(first d), supra note 3.
169. Proposed Amendment, U.C.C. § 1-201(37)(x)(ii), supra note 3.
170. The chameleon lease must be distinguished from the transubstantiation process criticized in supra text
accompanying notes 63-65. In the chameleon lease, the actions of the parties to the transaction bring about the change
in nature. By renewing the lease to the end of useful life, the parties have altered the character of their relationship from
a true lease to a security interest. The prior transaction is not recharacterized, but its nature changes as a result of the
subsequent actions of the parties.
In the transubstantiation process discussed above, a change in the market value of the residual, beyond the control
of the parties, resulted in the change from a true lease to a security interest (or the reverse), if the transaction is not
evaluated based upon the reasonable prediction of the parties at the outset. Since the parties cannot control the market
value of the residual, it is inherently unfair for the characterization of their transaction to change based upon factors wholly
outside their control. It is preferable to judge this transaction from the point when the relationship was initiated, and not
to subject it to differing treatment as market values rise and fall.
On the other hand, in the chameleon lease, there is no inherent unfairness in recharacterizing the transaction based
upon a changed relationship initiated by the parties themselves. Of course, as Professor Charles W. Mooney, Jr., noted
in his presentation on Article 2A at the ABA Convention, New York City, August 12, 1986, this change may occur at
a point in a continuing relationship when the parties are not aware of having altered their transaction. Professor Mooney
used the example of a month-to-month lease of consumer goods, with a monthly renewal option. At some point, the
renewal of this agreement for an additional month is a renewal to the end of useful life. The parties would not normally
be cognizant of the fact that this renewal is the economic equivalent of a purchase of the residual by the lessee. And yet,
under the Proposed Amendment, this becomes a lease to the end of useful life (assuming no right to terminate during the
month), and as a result it is no longer a true lease.
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The easiest example of this distinction is the purchase option. If a purchase
option passes the test of the Proposed Amendment-that is, it is not mandatory, and
it is not for nominal consideration-then the original transaction is a true lease. Of
course, when the option is exercised, the transaction is no longer a true lease: at that
point, it becomes a sale. But the subsequent sale does not change the characterization
of the original lease-it was a true lease until the moment the option was exercised.
On the other hand, if the sale option is for nominal value, or is mandated by the
agreement, then the transaction is deemed a security interest from its inception.
Although more difficult to grasp, the same is true of an option to renew. If the
lessee is bound to renew for the remaining economic life, or has the option to renew
for the remaining economic life for nominal consideration, then the original
transaction is a security interest. If neither of these clauses exist (or if the transaction
is terminable by the lessee), then the original transaction is a true lease, and nothing
that the parties do subsequently will result in a retroactive recharacterization of the
original transaction. This does not mean that the exercise of an option to renew can
never create a security interest. Just as the exercise of a purchase option changes the
transaction at the point of exercise from a true lease to a sale, the exercise of an option
to renew may change a transaction from a true lease to a disguised security interest.
For example, suppose that a lease contains an option to renew to the end of
economic life, but provides that the price of the renewal will be set at the time the
option is exercised. The original transaction is not a disguised security interest, but
a true lease. 171 But when the option to renew is exercised, this second transaction
creates a security interest, because it is a lease to the end of economic life. Although
the language of the Proposed Amendment does not clearly mandate this result, it
appears consistent with the overall scheme of the Proposed Amendment, and, I
believe, with its intent.172
Just as the Proposed Amendment identifies the provisions that will create a
security interest, it also identifies some lease provisions that do not alone create a
security interest. A transaction will not be found to be a security interest merely
because it provides:
(a) the present value of the consideration the lessee is obligated to pay under the lease
is substantially equal to or greater than the fair market value of the goods at the time the lease
is entered into,
(b) the lessee assumes risk of loss of the goods, or agrees to pay taxes, insurance, filing,
recording or registration fees, or service or maintenance on the goods,
(c) the lessee has an option to renew the lease or to become the owner of the goods,
(d) the lessee has an option to renew the lease for a fixed rent that is equal to or greater
than the reasonably predictable fair market rent for the use of the goods for the term of the
renewal at the time the option is to be performed, or
171. The original lease term is not to the end of economic life, and the renewal is not for a nominal amount. See
Proposed Amendment, U.C.C. § 1-201(37)(first a), and (first c), supra note 3. According to § 1-201(37)(second d), a
renewal for reasonably predictable fair market rent at the time the option is performed is not nominal, and under
§ 1-201(37)(x)(i), a renewal price determined at the time the option is performed is not nominal.
172. There are two problems in reaching the result presented in the text under the Proposed Amendment. See infra
text accompanying notes 224-30.
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(e) the lessee has the option to become the owner of the goods for a fixed price that is
equal to or greater than the reasonably predictable fair market value of the goods at the time
the option is to be performed. 173
These provisions are intended to undercut decisions focusing upon obligations of the
lessee under the lease which are not economically inconsistent with the existence of
a true lease.' 74 Under the Proposed Amendment, obligations that have been
considered indicia of ownership under prior case law, such as assumption of the risk
of loss or the obligation to pay taxes, will no longer be sufficient alone to support a
finding that the lease is a disguised security interest. 175 Similarly, the fact that the
lease provides for total payments which equal or exceed the purchase price of the
equipment will no longer be sufficient. 176
a. Nominal Value
It is helpful to take another look at the concept of nominal value because it is
critical to understanding which options to purchase and renew will create disguised
security interests, and which are consistent with the existence of true leases. The
Proposed Amendment contains two provisions that aid in determining whether an
amount is nominal. First, a lease with an option to renew for a rent, fixed in the original
lease agreement, which is equal to or greater than the reasonably predictable fair
market rent at the time the option is exercised, does not create a security interest. 177
The term "reasonably predictable" is used to refer to the facts and circumstances at
the time the transaction granting the option to renew is entered into. 78 Assume, for
example, that the original lease provides an option to renew, and sets a price for that
renewal option. If the price set is consistent with the anticipated fair market rent, then
there is a true lease. The negative implication of this provision is that a renewal option
price that is less than the anticipated fair market rent may create a security interest. 179
The same standard is applied to an option to purchase. If the option price set in
the agreement is equal to or greater than the reasonably predictable fair market value
of the goods at the end of the lease term, then the transaction is a true lease. 180 This
is consistent with a true nature analysis, which requires that the determination of the
residual value be as anticipated by the parties at the time the option price is set. 181
Whether the option is to purchase or renew, the courts must view the transaction
prospectively, determining not whether the option price is equal to the actual fair
market value of the residual at the time of exercise, but rather whether it is equal to
173. Proposed Amendment, U.C.C. § 1-201(37), supra note 3.
174. See supra text accompanying notes 115-30 for a discussion of these factors.
175. See supra text accompanying notes 120-30.
176. Proposed Amendment, U.C.C. § 1-201(37)(second a), supra note 3. See also id., Official Comment,
("Subparagraph (a) has no statutory derivative; it states that a full payout lease does not per se create a security
interest.").
177. Proposed Amendment, U.C.C. § 1-201(37)(second d), supra note 3.
178. Proposed Amendment, U.C.C. § 1-201(37)(y), supra note 3.
179. See Proposed Amendment, U.C.C. § 1-201(37), supra note 3, Official Comment. See infra note 184 quoting
the Official Comment.
180. Proposed Amendment, U.C.C. § 1-201(37)(e), supra note 3.
181. See supra text accompanying notes 63-66.
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the anticipated fair market value at the time the option price is set. This timing avoids
the transubstantiation problem that results when a court second-guesses the prediction
of the parties by focusing on the actual value of the residual at the time the option is
exercised. 182
The second step is found in the definition of nominal value, which provides that
an option price that is not set in the lease, but which the parties agree will be the fair
market rent or purchase price determined at the time of the exercise, is not
nominal. 8 3 The comment notes:
A fixed price purchase option in a lease does not of itself create a security interest. This is
particularly true if the fixed price is equal to or greater than the reasonably predictable fair
market value of the goods at the time the option is to be performed. A security interest is
created only if the option price is nominal and the [obligation for the term of the lease is not
subject to termination by the lessee]. There is a set of purchase options whose fixed price is
less than fair market value but greater than nominal that must be determined on the facts of
each case to ascertain whether the transaction in which the option is included creates a lease
or a security interest.1 4
b. Economic Life
The same prospective view of the transaction is applied to the issue of economic
life. A lease to the end of economic life is a security interest,185 as is an obligation
to renew to the end of economic life.18 6 The same is true of an option to renew for
the remaining economic life for nominal consideration.187 Remaining economic life
is determined as of the time the transaction is entered into.188 This is the appropriate
time for the determination, since an evaluation made at a later point could have the
effect of changing a transaction, understood by the parties to be a lease at its
initiation, into a security interest, due only to the changed actual value of the leased
goods-a factor wholly outside of the control of the parties.
Finally, the Proposed Amendment gives us our first Code definition of present
value, requiring that lease payments be discounted to present value at the rate
specified by the parties if not manifestly unreasonable, and in other circumstances, by
a commercially reasonable rate.18 9
182. See supra text accompanying notes 63-66, and 106-10.
183. Proposed Amendment, U.C.C. § 1-201(37)(x), supra note 3.
184. ProposedAmendment, U.C.C. § 1-201(37), supra note 3, Official Comment (emphasis added). The Comment
goes on to state: "It was possible to provide for various other permutations and combinations with respect to option to
purchase and renew. . . . This was not done because it would unnecessarily complicate the definition. Further
development of this rule is left to the courts." Id.
185. Proposed Amendment, U.C.C. § 1-201(37)(frst a), supra note 3. Again, remember that the first prong of this
test requires that the obligation not be terminable by the lessee. Id.
186. Proposed Amendment, U.C.C. § 1-201(37)(farst b), supra note 3.
187. Proposed Amendment, U.C.C. § 1-201(37)(fist c), supra note 3.
188. Proposed Amendment, U.C.C. § 1-201(37)(y), supra note 3.
189. Proposed Amendment, U.C.C. § 1-201(37)(z), supra note 3. See supra note 57.
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2. The Problem Transactions Revisited
It is helpful to go back to the true nature analysis and see how each of the
hypothetical problem transactions fares under the Proposed Amendment. 90 This
permits a clearer insight into the Amendment's actual operation. First, review the
transactions when there are options to buy the leased goods: 191
a. The Option to Buy
(1) The Mandatory Option
The mandatory option is a contract term requiring the lessee to exercise the
option. Under a true nature analysis, this creates a security interest because the
nominal lessee is contractually bound to purchase both the use and the residual, and
has no opportunity to return the residual to the lessor. The result is the same under
the Proposed Amendment. If the obligation is not terminable by the lessee, and the
lessee is obligated to acquire the residual, it is a security interest.' 92
(2) Optioning Out of the Lease Obligation
Suppose that by optioning out of the lease obligation, the lessee can purchase the
residual for less than the cost of performing the remainder of the lease. The true
nature analysis treats this transaction as a security interest, because the lessee who can
obtain both use and residual for less than the cost of use alone is effectively a
purchaser of the goods. Similarly, under the Proposed Amendment, because the
definition of "nominal" includes an option price that is less than the cost of
performing under the lease agreement, this provision creates an option to purchase for
nominal consideration, which is a security interest. 93
(3) Option Price Too Low
If the option price is less than the anticipated residual value of the goods, then
the true nature of this transaction is a security interest, because the nominal lessor is
not being fully compensated for ownership of the residual, and must previously have
transferred this residual to the lessee in exchange for some portion of the lease
payments. The result under the Proposed Amendment may be the same, although the
point at which the option price becomes nominal is not altogether clear.
The Proposed Amendment explicitly provides that a nominal price option creates
a security interest, and that payment of a price equal to or greater than the reasonably
predictable fair market value is not a security interest. 194 This creates the negative
inference that payment which is less than the reasonably predictable fair market value
190. See supra text accompanying notes 53-76.
191. See supra text accompanying notes 54-66.
192. Proposed Amendment, U.C.C. § 1-201(37)(first b), supra note 3.
193. Proposed Amendment, U.C.C. § 1-201(37)(first d), and (x)(ii), supra note 3.
194. Proposed Amendment, U.C.C. § 1-201(37)(Flrst d), and (e), supra note 3.
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is nominal. But the Official Comment notes that there is a class of option prices that
are less than fair market value but are not nominal. 195 As a result, it is unclear under
the Proposed Amendment what disparity between the fair market value and the option
price will trigger a finding that a security interest exists. 196 Obviously, the greater the
disparity, the more likely a finding that the transaction creates a security interest and
not a true lease. But the other factors which are properly considered by a court
making this determination are not provided by the Proposed Amendment.
(4) The Right Option Price
When the lease contains an option price equal to or greater than the reasonably
predictable fair market value, we have a true lease for true nature purposes as well as
under the Proposed Amendment. The option payment fully compensates the lessor for
the ownership of the residual. 197 The Proposed Amendment reaches this result by
stating that an option to purchase for a fixed price equal to or greater than the
anticipated fair market value does not create a security interest.198
(5) The Nominal Option Price
Under a true nature determination, a nominal option price creates a disguised
security interest only when it is less than the anticipated residual value of the goods.
If it is equal to or greater than this residual value, it is not nominal merely because
it is a small dollar amount, or because it is small in relation to the value of the goods
at the transaction's inception. The same is true under the Proposed Amendment.199 So
long as the price is equal to or greater than the anticipated value of the residual being
transferred upon exercise of the option, the option price is not nominal. Even an
option price that is less than the reasonably predictable value of the residual is not
necessarily a nominal option price under the Proposed Amendment. At some point an
option price will be considered nominal when it is sufficiently below the fair market
value of the residual. 20° The problem with small option prices which are not nominal
under the definition in the Proposed Amendment is that they may indicate a lease to
the end of useful life.
b. Leases to the End of Economic Life
The second set of hypotheticals addressed leases to the end of useful life, or, as
it is referred to in the Proposed Amendment, economic life:201
195. Proposed Amendment, U.C.C. § 1-201(37), supra note 3, Official Comment. See supra text at note 184
quoting the Official Comment.
196. See infra text accompanying notes 218-30 further examining this issue.
197. Proposed Amendment, U.C.C. § 1-201(37)(e), supra note 3.
198. Id.
199. Proposed Amendment, U.C.C. § 1-201(37)(second a), (e), and (y), supra note 3.
200. Proposed Amendment, U.C.C. § 1-201(37), supra note 3, Official Comment. See supra text accompanying
note 184 quoting the Official Comment.
201. See supra text accompanying notes 67-72.
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(1) Substantial Residual Value
When there is a substantial residual value at the end of the initial lease term, the
transaction is a true lease under the true nature analysis, so long as the original lease
does not contain an option to renew for nominal consideration. This is also a true
lease under the Proposed Amendment. 20 2
(2) Lease to the End of Economic Life
Although this Article has posited the possibility of a true lease to the end of
useful life, when the lessee assumes the risk that useful life will be greater than
anticipated, with the residual remaining the property of the lessor, it has also
recognized the inability to distinguish it from a disguised security interest when there
is in fact no meaningful residual. The Proposed Amendment opts for a bright-line
test, and does not recognize true leases to the end of economic life.203 Because the
Proposed Amendment requires that the determination of remaining economic life be
made as of the time that the lease transaction is entered into,204 it leaves unresolved
the question whether an attempt to create a true lease by documenting an optimistic
economic life will be enforceable. 20 5
(3) Successive Transactions in the Same Goods
An example of successive transactions in the same goods is a lease of goods with
a two year anticipated life to different lessees for successive one year terms. When
the first lease is entered into, it is not a security agreement but a true lease. But the
second lease is a security interest under the true nature analysis, because there is no
meaningful residual to return to the lessor. The Proposed Amendment also finds that
the second lease is a security interest, because the original lease term is to the end of
economic life. 20 6 Presumably, filing would be required at the beginning of the second
lease, if the interest of the lessor in the goods is to be protected during the second
lease transaction.
202. Proposed Amendment, U.C.C. § 1-201(37)(first a), supra note 3.
203. Proposed Amendment, U.C.C. § 1-201(37)(first a), supra note 3. See also id.,U.C.C. § 1-201(37)(fust b).
204. Proposed Amendment, U.C.C. § 1-2 01(37 )(y), supra note 3 (definitions of "reasonably predictable" and
.,remaining economic life").
205. See supra text accompanying note 72. I do not argue for the protection of a sham transaction analogous to
Appleway Leasing, Inc. v. Wilken, 39 Or. App. 43, 591 P.2d 382 (1979), discussed supra text accompanying notes
111-12. Under the true nature analysis, a court could certainly find that the anticipated residual set by the parties did not
reflect a reasonably predictable value, as required by the Proposed Amendment, and hold that the transaction created a
security interest. The same may be true of an unreasonable estimate of economic life. But while the Proposed Amendment
requires that the residual be the "reasonably predictable fair market" rent or value, Proposed Amendment, U.C.C.
§ 1-201(37)(second d), and (e), supra note 3, it does not require that the remaining economic life be "reasonably
predictable," but only that it be determined prospectively from the inception of the transaction. Proposed Amendment,
U.C.C. § 1-201(37)(y), supra note 3. Thus, there is at least a technical argument that an unduly optimistic economic life
may be enforceable under the Proposed Amendment. At a less technical level, however, when the parties agree that there
may realistically be a residual value that cannot be determined, or an economic life beyond that anticipated, and intend
that any residual, whatever its value, remain the property of the lessor after the agreement is terminated, in theory, this
should sustain a finding of a true lease.
206. Proposed Amendment, U.C.C. § 1-201(37)(first a), supra note 3.
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(4) Option to Renew to the End of Economic Life
An option to renew to the end of economic life is the chameleon lease, which is
a true lease when the original transaction is entered into, but which becomes a
security interest when the option to renew is exercised. It becomes a security interest
at that point because it is a lease to the end of useful life.20 7 It is more fully explored
in the third category, leases with options to renew.
c. Options to Renew
(1) The Mandatory Option to Renew
Under the Proposed Amendment, a lease containing a mandatory option to
renew creates a security interest if the renewal period is for the remaining economic
life of the goods. 208 Otherwise, there is no security interest based solely upon a
contract term mandating a renewal.
(2) Option to Renew for Less Than Anticipated Value
Under the Proposed Amendment, if the renewal price is less than the anticipated
use value of the goods for the period of renewal, there may be a security interest, but
only when the amount paid for the renewal option is sufficiently low to trigger a
finding that it is nominal. The Proposed Amendment provides that an option to renew
for no consideration or nominal consideration creates a security interest, but only if
the renewal is to the end of economic life. 2° 9 Again, there is no guidance in the text
of the Proposed Amendment for determining the point at which this amount will be
deemed nominal, but the Official Comment raises the possibility that an amount less
than the fair market value may not be considered nominal, and therefore would not
create a security interest. 210
It is essential to remember that nominal price only creates a security interest
under the Proposed Amendment when the renewal is to the end of economic life.
Likewise, under the true nature theory, a renewal option would create a security
interest only when the renewal is also to the end of economic life. This is true
regardless of the price of the renewal option. If there is a meaningful residual at the
end of the renewal period which returns to the lessor, the true nature of the transaction
cannot be a security interest, no matter what disparity exists between the anticipated
value of the renewal right and the option price. 2 1
207. Id. This presumes, of course, that the obligation of the lessee is not terminable, satisfying the first requirement
of the test. On the nature of a chameleon lease, see supra note 170 and accompanying text. There is, of course, tho
argument that the subsequent renewal lease cannot be a security interest because it does not fall under the literal language
of the amendment that "the original term of the lease is equal to or greater than the remaining economic life of the goods."
Proposed Amendment, U.C.C. § 1-201(37)(fhrst a), supra note 3. This issue is discussed in greater detail in infra text
accompanying notes 218-230.
208. Proposed Amendment, U.C.C. § 1-201(37)(first b), supra note 3.
209. Proposed Amendment, U.C.C. § 1-201(37)(first c), supra note 3.
210. ProposedAmendment, U.C.C. § 1-201(37), supra note 3, Official Comment; see supra text at note 184 quoting
the Official Comment. Although the comment refers specifically to options to purchase, the context makes clear that this
issue would also apply to an option to renew.
211. This problem is more fully explored supra text accompanying notes 73-76.
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(3) Option to Renew for the Anticipated Value
If the renewal price is equal to or greater than the fair market rent for the goods,
then the Proposed Amendment does not consider this a security interest based upon
the price, because the renewal price is not nominal. 212 But it does raise the possibility
that the transaction is a security interest if the renewal period is to the end of
economic life. So long as this renewal is not to the end of economic life, both the
original lease and the renewal are true leases under the Proposed Amendment. This
is consistent with the result under true nature theory. Regardless of the renewal price,
if there is a meaningful residual returned to the lessor at the end of the renewal term,
the transaction is a true lease. But the Amendment does not answer the question
whether the renewal to the end of economic life might result in a recharacterization,
so that, while the original transaction remains a true lease, the renewal becomes a
security interest as a lease to the end of economic life.
(4) Option to Renew to the End of Economic Life
If the renewal option passes the nominal value test under the Proposed
Amendment, then a security interest can be created only if the renewal is to the end
of economic life.21 3 If the renewal is mandatory and to the end of economic life, then
this creates a security interest from the inception of the transaction. 21 4 If the renewal
is optional, to the end of economic life, and for nominal consideration, this creates
a security interest from the inception. 2 5 But if the renewal is optional, to the end of
economic life, but not for nominal consideration, the Proposed Amendment leaves us
with an interesting problem. The original lease would not be a security interest, but
the renewal creates one, as a lease to the end of economic life.216 Again, this is the
chameleon transaction, 217 which would require a filing to protect the interest of the
lessor from the point when the option to renew is exercised.
C. Some Unanswered Questions Under the Proposed Amendment
One issue not fully clarified by the Proposed Amendment is the interaction
between option prices and leases to the end of economic life.218 What result will
occur if the parties set an option price that is equal to a minimal residual value,
because the lease is essentially one for the economic life of the transaction? If we
focus upon the option price, the transaction will not be considered a security interest,
because the Proposed Amendment specifies that an option price equal to or greater
212. Proposed Amendment, U.C.C. § 1-201(37)(second d), supra note 3.
213. Proposed Amendment, U.C.C. § 1-201(37)(first a), and (y), supra note 3.
214. Proposed Amendment, U.C.C. § 1-201(37)(first b), supra note 3.
215. Proposed Amendment, U.C.C. § 1-201(37)(first c), supra note 3.
216. Although the Proposed Amendment refers to "the original term of the lease" as being equal to or greater than
the remaining economic life, presumably this provision would also apply to a renewal, once exercised, which becomes
a lease to the end of economic life. Proposed Amendment, U.C.C. § 1-201(37)(lirst a), supra note 3. See infra text
accompanying notes 218-30 for a discussion of this issue.
217. See supra note 170.
218. See supra note 114 for a discussion of this issue.
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than anticipated residual value is not a security interest.2 19 But if we view the
transaction as a lease to the end of economic life, it will be considered a security
interest.220 Which of these views should prevail?
It is appropriate to consider this transaction a security interest. In fact, a case
cited by the Official Comment reached this result.221 Since all meaningful residual is
being transferred to the lessee for the lease payments, plus a small amount for the
residual upon exercise of the option, this transaction should be considered primarily
a lease to the end of economic life. Only when the value of the residual represents a
meaningful interest to the lessor should the transaction be viewed as a true lease.
Arguably, this should include those cases in which the parties understand that the
residual value is not known, but they nevertheless agree that the residual will remain
the property of the lessor, unless payment equal to the then determined fair market
value is made. But when both parties agree and understand that the residual has no
anticipated value to the lessor, and the lessor intends for that value to become the
property of the lessee, the transaction should not be saved from a finding that it is a
security interest by a lease provision permitting transfer of the residual for an amount
equal to the anticipated residual value, or for the fair market value to be determined
at the point of exercise.
The second unresolved issue is the absence of any guidance in the Proposed
Amendment describing when the amount of an option to buy or renew is nominal. An
option payment that is less than the anticipated fair market value is not necessarily
nominal under the Proposed Amendment. The troubling language in the Official
Comment, which notes that there is a category of options whose price is less than fair
market value but greater than nominal,222 pinpoints this problem, but offers little
guidance. The comment merely provides that these must be determined "on the facts
of each case."22 Given what the courts have done when left with this slim guidance
under the current version of Section 1-201(37), this gap in the definition of nominal
value could create the same problems which the Proposed Amendment is intended to
resolve.
Remember that nominal value is only relevant when there is an option to
purchase the goods, or to renew the lease to the end of economic life. In other words,
we need a definition of nominal that will address a transfer of all remaining residual
value, and recognize that transfer of this value for sufficient payment does not make
the initial transaction a disguised security interest. For example, it would be
preferable to provide that an option payment less than the anticipated fair market rent
or value is nominal when it would not induce a reasonable lessor to transfer the
residual outside of the context of the lease agreement. If no reasonable lessor would
transfer the entire residual in exchange for the option payment, absent a prior lease
219. Proposed Amendment, U.C.C. § 1-201(37)(e), supra note 3.
220. Proposed Amendment, U.C.C. § 1-201(37)(fist a), supra note 3.
221. In re Celeryvale, 44 Bankr. 1007 (Bankr. E.D. Tenn. 1984), discussed supra text accompanying notes 113-14,
which is cited with approval in the Official Comment to Proposed Amendment, U.C.C. § 1-201(37), supra note 3.
222. ProposedAmendment, U.C.C. § 1-201(37), supra note 3, Official Coment; see supra text at note 184 quoting
the Official Comment.
223. Id.
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relationship between the lessor and lessee, then the option payment is not compen-
sating the lessor for the value of the residual, but is completing payment, and the
transaction is a security interest, and was from the inception. This test, or any similar
test which gives the courts guidance as to the operation of the section, is better than
the "other facts" guidance offered by the Official Comment.
The third difficulty is the question whether the Proposed Amendment intends to
prevent the possibility of a chameleon lease. It is unclear whether the Proposed
Amendment contemplates that a transaction will be characterized from the inception,
and then never change, regardless of the effect of an option to renew, or whether an
option to renew may properly result in a new character, which does not change the
nature of the original transaction. This Article has assumed that the chameleon lease
still exists under the Proposed Amendment, so that a renewal to the end of economic
life may result in a recharacterization of the transaction from the point when the
option is exercised, but not from the inception of the transaction. 224 But there are two
difficulties in reaching this result.
First, the literal language of the Proposed Amendment states that a security
interest exists when "the original term of the lease is equal to or greater than the
remaining economic life of the goods.' 225 If this provision is applied narrowly, then
the initial transaction is a true lease, and no renewal can be anything but a true lease,
so long as the original term is not to the end of economic life. This would include a
renewal to the end of economic life, as long as the renewal option price is not nominal
and the renewal is not mandatory. 226
However, it is also possible to read this provision to mean simply that the
original transaction is a security interest when the period is to the end of economic
life, or when it contains a mandatory option to renew to the end of economic life, or
an option to renew to the end of economic life for nominal consideration. These
provisions do not answer the question whether a renewal to the end of economic life
can change a transaction that was previously a true lease into a security interest, not
from the inception but only from the point of exercise. The analogy of the purchase
option makes this argument a compelling one.227 We know that, upon exercise of a
purchase option, the transaction is no longer a lease but a sale, but the exercise of this
option does not normally mean that the original transaction was always a disguised
security interest.228 There is no reason why an option to renew should not receive
comparable treatment.
The second impediment to this argument is the language of Official Comment (j)
to Section 2A-103. That comment implies, through the use of a thirty-six month lease
hypothetical, that the words "original term" mean literally the first term, regardless
224. See supra text accompanying notes 170-73.
225. Proposed Amendment, U.C.C. § 1-201(37)(first a), supra note 3.
226. Cf. Proposed Amendment, U.C.C. § 1-201(37)(furst b), and (frst c), supra note 3.
227. See supra text following note 170.
228. The original transaction is only a disguised security interest when the option to purchase is mandatory,
Proposed Amendment, U.C.C. § 1-201(37)(f'rst a), supra note 3, or when the option to purchase is for no or nominal
consideration. Proposed Amendment, U.C.C. § 1-201(37)(f'est d), supra note 3.
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of the effect of subsequent renewals.229 On the other hand, the same comment
contains language supporting the position that a chameleon transaction is still possible
under the Proposed Amendment. The comment states: "However, with each renewal
of the lease the facts and circumstances at the time of each renewal must be examined
to determine if that conclusion remains accurate, as it is possible that a transaction
that first creates a lease, later creates a security interest."O3o
This comment is strong evidence of the continued viability of a chameleon
lease, with the change in character occurring after the exercise of a renewal option as
well as a sale option. On balance, it is consistent with the intent of the Proposed
Amendment to conclude that a renewal to the end of economic life may create a
security interest from the point of exercise, notwithstanding the fact that the "original
term of the lease" is not literally to the end of economic life, but the renewal period
is.
IV. CONCLUSION
This Article began with the premise that there is a distinction between a sale, a
lease, and a security interest, and that it is essential for the participants to these
transactions to ascertain in advance how a court will treat their transactions. It posits
the existence of a true nature, which, when pinpointed, permits a court and the
participants to differentiate between security interests and leases by examining the
economic allocation resulting from the contract between the parties. Recognizing that
not every transaction has a true nature which is easily pinpointed, it suggests a
bright-line test which results in consistent treatment, but only in those cases that
cannot otherwised be distinguished.
Although the Proposed Amendment offers some potential for interpretive
problems,231 the new definition of "security interest" focuses attention where it
should be, upon the economic allocation between lessor and lessee effected by the
transaction, viewed as of the time it is entered into. It does not rely upon the intent
of the parties as expressed in their documents, nor upon the specific obligations of the
lessee under the lease. It views the transaction as a whole, interpreting the nature of
the transaction according to the same issues which motivate the parties to enter into
these transactions. While it does not provide an answer to every conceivable
transaction, it is a grand improvement over the current guidelines provided by the
U.C.C., and it offers a philosophical viewpoint that should guide courts in their
application of the law to transactions for which no clear answer is provided.
229. Article 2A, supra note 3, § 2A-103, Official Comment Ci).
230. Id. (emphasis added).
231. See supra text accompanying notes 218-30. An additional potential interpretive problem arises when one
considers a lease wherein the obligation of the lessee is terminable, but only upon payment of liquidated damages specified
in the lease agreement. Under the strict application of the rule, a terminable obligation cannot be a security interest, and
yet one can imagine an amount that would be equivalent to the payment obligation under the lease, leaving the lessee with
the residual economic value of the goods. Under the second part of the test, this would qualify as a security interest,
because it is an agreement wherein the lessee is bound to become the owner of the goods, but because it fails the literal
language of the first part, it could be considered a lease of goods which only later is the subject of a sale.
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The Proposed Amendment is an effective and timely reminder to courts
addressing leasing transactions that a laundry list of prohibited contract terms will not
ultimately help to distinguish security interests from leases. The drafters of these
documents are simply too clever, and the issue arises again and again. Only by
concentrating upon the economic transfer represented by the goods can the true nature
of these transactions be identified, and their categorization should now be possible
with consistent and reliable results. With the adoption of this Proposed Amendment,
the parties and the courts will, for the first time, have a sound basis upon which to
judge the nature of their contractual agreements.
